One thing to note that after that disasterous Apache raid early in the war, the Army quickly changed tactics. Yeah, bad shit happens in war, but a sign of professionalism is that you learn quick and don’t do the same mistakes twice. You just make new mistakes :)
Anyway, they noted a few tactics the Iraqi’s used for that ambush of the Apaches.
For one, signals intelligence determined that the Iraqi’s were using cell phones to track the Apache’s forward progress. They had no radar warning, but they just had guys on the front lines, and when they heard the Apaches fly over, they called their central HQ. When the Apaches flew over the next guy with a cell phone, he called it in. Very Black Hawk Down-like raid warning system.
The Iraqi’s then shut down all the power to a town, killing the lights. The Apache’s were lured in close, and when the lights were switched on, that not only was the signal for everyone to open fire, but the Apaches were so close that they were also illuminated by the lights.
After that raid, the Apaches started using more standoff tactics, and I bet that the Air Force probably started going for cell phone nodes and towers.
But yeah, Apache was designed for combat in Germany or something that actually has terrain features, like canyons or valleys and hills and trees and forests. If you’re hovering 30 feet over the desert, there is no place to hide. It’s all flat, and there’s no trees to duck behind.
The irony of this is I remember after Gulf War I, all the pundits were predicting the death of the tank and the rise of the helicopter as the new aerial tank.
As for Kosovo, there’s a lot of blame that still goes around over that. From what I heard, the blame was on the defense budgets of the time. Army pilots were getting shit for flying hours, and then suddenly they needed to get proficient in night flying in really rugged terrain, so they did a crash course (no pun intended). But that’s where they got in trouble, and an Apache slammed into the ground and the crew was killed.
But yeah, it didn’t help that the Pentagon was seriously dragging its feet on the issue. Clark was screaming for ground troops and permission to escalate the air campaign with Apaches, and the Pentagon and White House were doing everything to avoid risking American ground forces and helicopters. Unfortunately, this half-assed way of waging war was totally ineffective, and it wasn’t until Clinton and NATO grudgingly came to the realization that they had to have the realistic threat of inserting ground troops into the equation did the Yugoslavs yield.