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The UK wants to keep the border open, but not in that way, and certainly not in that way permanently.
Well that’s pretty harsh, specially the NI border issue (the payment requirement is obvious though, there’s little dubious about the obligations).
Tell that to the UK government! May has been defending the backstop for quite some time now.
I don’t think the EU cares about Farage, unless he gets into government, of course.
The EU is the world’s largest trading block (and the world’s second largest economy, behind China and ahead of the US). In the world of trade, the EU is as near an 800-pound gorilla as you get; The loss of the UK will hurt, of course, but the EU is still going to be a trade and regulations behemoth after Brexit, and will still employ the best negotiators in Europe.
The EU isn’t going to “harden” its position as such, but once the UK is out, they will - presumably - treat the UK like any other external state, unlike the kid’s gloves being used today. Terms are
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4252
The backstop was very clearly a concession that May didn’t want to make that she agreed to because that was the price of the deal. Pretending otherwise comes across as extremely disingenuous.
Of course she is defending the backstop - because she wants to get the deal through. But the backstop itself is not what the UK government “wants”.
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The EU has explicitly said it will treat the UK more harshly than any other external state, because A50 wasn’t drafted to give the EU everything to which it thinks it is entitled.
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The obligations flow from EU law, not international law. The treaties and agreements made under their auspices specify what needs to be paid into the EU budget at what times.
When the treaties cease to apply to the UK, all those obligations that are entered into under the auspices of the treaties also cease to apply.
The WA is pretty sensible, with the “standstill” transition period going up to the end of the EU budgetary period it effectively removes the budget overhang issue. there’s certainly a diplomatic and moral case for some monies to be paid - but pretending it is a clear cut legal matter is simply wrong.
No. But then the trade deals they get, are a completely different world from what the UK benefits from today, or even what countries like Norway et al do. UK industry isn’t going to be competitive in Europe under WTO rules and to get the kind of trade deal that will allow for it to be competitive again, the UK will have to accept to play by EU rules. The deal Canada has on services (which is something similar to what the UK will need to negotiate) is a good example; it contains 500 sectoral/regional exemptions - something which is illegal within the EU, but not so for non-EU countries. In short, in future it will be perfectly valid for contractors to discriminate against UK companies, something which is not allowed by EU members today.
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There’s a link just a few posts up. For crying out loud.
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For me, the best outcome is Remain (leaving aside the democratic repercussions), but the 2nd best outcome is an amicable split followed by a Canada style trade deal. Obviously it’s not as good, but it avoids the kind of mess Switzerland and Norway encounter on a regular basis.
From my perspective a major plank of EU diplomacy has been to try and avoid the Canada-style outcome. Because while it wouldn’t be great it wouldn’t be a disaster and Juncker, Selmayr et al. need any true separation from the EU to be a disaster (emotionally if not politically).
Nowhere in that link does any EU official state that they’ll treat the UK harsher than other external countries.
I think the current (probably wet paper by now) PD actually assumes a Canada style outcome (nothwitstanding the NI issue). The problem is the WA, not the final deal.
The issue is that the EU can’t engage in real trade negotiations untill the UK leaves (this was said from the get go) so we don’t really have a lot of clarity to what the EU will be open trade-wise. All we know is preferences, red lines, and the requirements for the transition period.
But the backstop was the UK’s idea - instead of the entirety of the UK remaining in the regulatory/customs domain of the EU (the ‘easy’ solution to this problem), only NI would (and the EU granted special privileges to NI to allow it - a significant concession on their part).
Keeping the border as-is requires something like this. That’s a concession only to reality, not the EU.
That’s “won’t”, not “can’t”.
That’s a weird justification for calling it ‘questionable basis in international law.’ I mean, if you agree that the obligation exists and that the UK freely entered into the a body that could impose such an obligation, what’s left to question?
I get that you think that, but that doesn’t make it so. If you enter into a contract that has e.g. a cancellation penalty, and then cancel the contract, you can’t avoid the cancellation penalty by claiming it doesn’t apply because you’ve canceled the contract.
Under article 50 all that can be negotiated is the WA and the “taking into account the framework of the future relationship” AKA the PD.
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Please point to the cancellation penalty in the treaty of Lisbon.
It’s hard to imagine any plain language reading of the text that actively forbids negotiation of future trade relationships. A phrase as vague as “taking into account the framework of the future relationship” could easily encompass anything from a broad statement to a detailed agreement, ready to be executed.
We obviously can’t sign a trade agreement before actually leaving, but negotiating what it would be is perfectly possible. If the EU wanted to.
