But I still expect May to bring something back from Brussels. To do so would be an utter failure.
After that, things get interesting. The main leverage No. 10 have been using to get their deal (whatever their deal is) over the line is that to vote it down would plunge the UK into chaos of no-deal. (That’s probably not true, but it’s enough of a scare that it might have got enough Labour MPs to vote with the government on this.)
All sorts of people would be unhappy with this arrangement - ERG, DUP, very pro-EU MPs in all parties - the extremists on every side, basically. But I suspect this would have a good shot at passing wtih the Tory loyalists and moderate/scared/anti-EU Labour MPs. Risky, but plausible.
The DUP threat changes things. Their threat to vote down the budget, rather than the final deal, ruins the line about ‘this deal or chaos’ because, hey, it’s just the budget! Labour will vote against the budget, SNP will vote against the budget, everyone will vote against the budget. So unless May capitulates here, no budget.
In previous years, losing would bring the government down. In this case, while it would be a massive embarrassment, the Fixed Term Parliament Act makes it irrelevant. So it lets the DUP bully the government around without causing a General Election. So they have a full range of powers here: from voting down minor bills and amendments (already done) to the budget (a threat that nobody doubts they’d go for), to bringing down the government in a no-confidence motion (they probably wouldn’t, but if they voted down the budget, would you really want to push them on this?).
Let me be very clear - according to your own source the EU is insisting that a “no deal” scenario would immediately result in the UK not only having third country status, but third country status with less in the way of general regulatory cooperation than (for example) Russia. Furthermore the EU is using this as a threat to demand its interpretation of the outstanding balance (which the UK is largely willing to concede on) and the Good Friday Agreement (which has become more and more extreme as the process has continued) are adhered to.
It’s clear that the intent of A50 withdrawal process is to at least somewhat address the issues the author talks about - yet the EU has refused to do so unless the UK agrees concessions regarding NI that the UK cannot realistically make.
In what way is “Give us control of regulatory and trade policy for NI or be punished” not punitive?
The EU is ‘insisting on’ taking the UK’s Article 50 invocation in good faith. Crazy for them to do that.
I imagine that if May put a deal on the table that didn’t violate fundamental EU principles, they’d applaud. As it is, the EU seems to be willing to let the UK have the very best non-EU member status available, but the UK won’t accept that. I’d bet the EU would allow the UK to remain in a ‘transitional status’ that didn’t violate the EU principles pretty much forever. Those diabolical bastards!
Just please - could you stop replying to me? It’s not like the pro-EU viewpoint is poorly represented here. Do you have some pathological need to troll me? What is your fucking problem?
You do realize that Russia - for instance - has spent literally years of negotiation to put in place the current trade agreements it has with the EU. These things don’t happen by magic - no matter what lie the Brexiteers peddle. So I’m not sure what part of “when you choose to be a third country, you have third country status” is hard to understand? As Rogers notes: “… the club you are leaving is not going to alter its rules and do things which are wholly unprecedented for a non-member, simply because you used to be a member.”
The same goes for the NI question. As I think I’ve pointed out above a couple of times - no matter how unfair, how unacceptable, or how punishing the UK thinks it is, the EU isn’t going to fundamentally change its core principles to accommodate a soon-to-be ex-member.
Again, Rogers makes a couple of nice points about trade negotiations: “Trade negotiations with any regional power bloc or major country are hard ball brutal negotiations… But core Brexit advocates also believe, bizarrely, that in the one area the EU HAS genuine superpower capabilities - the regulatory and trade domain which we were central to building via the Single Market project - it will not exercise its superpower muscles when dealing with us as a former member.”
Of course they will. Of course they are. Because the job of the EU negotiators is not to cater to injured British sensibilities… it’s to get the best trade deal possible for the EU.
Yes, and as I said, the EU is refusing to make any agreements regarding these matters unless the UK makes concessions over trade and regulatory sovereignity of Northern Ireland. I’m not sure how that is part of their “core principles”.
I’m rather tired of people replying to me while doing their best to ignore my key point.
While I agree about the awful negotiating position, I am curious as to what other negotiating position could have been achieved. Bear in mind that at the time they activated A50 the EU was (perfectly reasonably) refusing to begin negotiations of any kind until A50 was activated. What alternate approach could have been used? Am I missing something?
(Also, the one thing they were able to negotiate on before A50 was the Irish border, through bilateral talks with the Irish. No more was achieved than a general statement of principle, but in any case the PM, and Irish policy, changed after the A50 notification. What this underlines is that any pre-negotiation would have been completely non-binding and therefore largely meaningless.)
It would have meant faithfully engaging with the task at hand, and its realities.The EU asked us to jump out of the aeroplane before starting negotiations on a parachute; we cheerfully obliged.
If we really wanted to leave under the Article 50 terms, we’d have to prepare for leaving - with nothing arranged - two years hence. We didnt.
Recall, before triggering Article 50, a 2-year transition had not even been spoken of. It’s not in Article 50. We’re lucky we even have that as an option.
Finally: even if we get a withdrawal agreement, guess what happens in two years time from now? Another cliff-edge, where the EU gets to negotiate with an unprepared UK - one that is a third country at that point. This is the easy bit. If you think that EU have been playing ‘real politik’ at our expense, just wait.
Again, so what? Article 50 is a parachute, you’re not supposed to jump out the plane because the beverages weren’t to your liking.
And it’s not the EU’s fault that the Brits bought the story of they need us more than we need them. And really, no deal is better than a bad deal, at least for the EU.
The EU claims it wants a smooth transition and a continued relationship consistent with the level of commitment the UK is willing to make - and their negotiating position has been broadly consistent with that. However their demands regarding NI seem extraordinary to me, and they have made any form of agreement completely conditional on getting what they want on the NI issue (which is effectively a poison pill).
I’m open to arguments as to whether those demands are really so extraordinary, or whether they are truly required by the situation.
Obviously May hasn’t helped the situation - she clearly hoped a “softish” Brexit was possible, but it’s proven not to be. It’s Norway, give up significant NI sov, or no deal. If it was Norway, Canada or no deal I would be right there arguing that May’s plan is nonsense and the EU is as entitled to defend its red lines as the UK is.
