http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/01/magazine/01SHIITE.html?pagewanted=1&8hpib
Good article in the New York Times Magazine on the Shi’ia situation as a follow up to my previous comments in this thread.
But in all of the Shiite south and even in Baghdad’s Sadr City, a slow-motion Islamicization is steadily gathering strength. It is difficult to see how any transitional government, even one shaped by the Iraqi Governing Council and the C.P.A., could stop this. The fact is that the Shiites are pushing on what may well be an open door. No secular Iraqi party – not the Communists who once led the fight against Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, and not the Iraqi National Congress – seems to be able to garner significant popular support among Iraqis. The Sunnis have yet to deal with what will inevitably be a reduced role in the new Iraq. The Kurds are concerned only with their self-determination, not with taking power nationally. If the Shiites have taken center stage, they have done so by default.
In the wake of the failed Shiite uprising of 1991, Hussein turned much of southern Iraq into a Shiite graveyard. Its deserts and its farmlands hold the corpses of the tens of thousands of Shiites murdered by Hussein’s security forces. Almost every Iraqi, and certainly every Shiite, seems to believe that the United States encouraged them to rise against Saddam Hussein. The fact that the Americans did nothing to help causes many Shiites to feel great enmity for the United States. For most Iraqi Shiites, the betrayal of 1991 is a scar that even the overthrow of Saddam Hussein cannot heal.
In the summer and fall of 2003, the senior clerics had been firm in their rejection of Moqtadah al-Sadr’s demands for an Islamic state led by clerics. As one Iraqi journalist with close links to the Shiite hierarchy in Najaf put it to me in December: ‘‘The grand ayatollahs are all opposed to Moqtadah’s demands. They think that it is stupid to confront the coalition. And they fear that it will lead to a war among the Shiites – the thing that they fear most in the world.’’ Sistani and his colleagues were able to more or less neutralize Moqtadah – even Moqtadah’s own principal aide told me in Najaf that Moqtadah had made ‘‘mistakes’’ that his enemies had ‘‘taken advantage of’’ – and at the end of the year, they seemed to be in a position to influence the course of the future Iraqi state, regardless of the type of election held.
Yet Sistani’s call for demonstrations and the rhetoric of those demonstrations were anything but moderate. The crowd shouted slogans like ‘‘One man, one vote’’ and ‘‘No, no to appointment,’’ and demonstrators and speakers insisted that they would never accept an American ‘‘colonialist’’ state.
In my experience, American officials, not to mention ordinary American soldiers, reject the idea that they are genuinely disliked in Iraq, except, of course, in the Sunni Triangle. And yet when I spoke to Ayatollah Najafi, his dislike for the United States, like that of most Shiite clerics I met, was palpable. The entry of Sistani and the rest of the Najaf clerical hierarchy into the fray has almost certainly changed the rules of the game in Iraq, not just in terms of the actual decision on what sort of election will be held, but in terms of Iraq’s entire post-Saddam Hussein future. Insurgents can harass and kill U.S. forces, but they are doing little to shift power their way in Iraq. With the demonstrations, Sistani managed to fundamentally alter the Iraqi political equation without one of his followers firing a shot. Moqtadah al-Sadr and his followers now have little choice but to fall in line, and Sistani is securing for his Shiite power base greater representation for its interests and its vision of how Iraq should be governed when the nation regains its independence, as early as next summer.
A related article on Salon.com
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/01/30/ayatollahs/index.html
I met with the spokesman for Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi, one of the three most important Shiite leaders in Iraq apart from Sistani. (The others are Mohammed Said Hakim and Mohammed Ishaq Fayyad). The three lesser leaders all command significant numbers of followers and their teachings differ from Sistani’s in modest ways. But overall, they and their followers acquiesce to Sistani’s ultimate authority (especially now, since they’ve put on a united front to deal with the Americans). This is not necessarily the case with Muqtada al-Sadr, a young Shiite cleric whose popularity derives foremost from his legacy as the son of Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr. In the 1990s, the older al-Sadr gained a significant following by defying Saddam Hussein’s iron-fisted anti-Shiite edicts (for instance, his attempt to forbid Friday prayer). Saddam had him assassinated in 1999. Though Muqtada does not have his father’s seniority or clout, he’s shown he cannot be ignored. Shortly after the end of the war, Muqtada organized large anti-American protests and, at one point, attempted to set up his own alternative government. Shiites tell me that, in general, he is not widely respected. But he has served as the focal point for anti-American sentiment and, these days, that means a lot. Lately, though, he has dropped somewhat from the scene. I’ve heard that he’s being checked somewhat by Sistani’s influence, but I cannot say that with certainty.
I began by asking Abu Saduk what he thought about the American presence in Iraq. He shrugged and focused on the ceiling above my head. “Before we were ruled by the student,” he said. “Now the teacher is ruling.” Abu Saduk went on to explain that the United States was responsible for Saddam (backing him in his early days and providing support during the Iran-Iraq war). “The Americans came to Iraq for strategic and economic interests – to secure the region for themselves. They cannot be trusted, nor can any election conducted during the occupation.”
Before the war, Saddam persecuted – often brutally – the Shiites in Iraq. This is the reason that U.S. neoconservative strategists, whose starry-eyed optimism was not shared by scholars who actually knew something about Iraq and its people, assumed that the Shiite population would cheerlead the U.S. invasion and at least tolerate the occupation. Sistani’s demands caught the United States off guard.
“Right now,” Abu Saduk told me, “it [jihad] is not necessary. We hope that America – a distant hope – will keep its promises and leave Iraq.”
Most Shiites I’ve spoken to say that the chances of Sistani’s declaring jihad are incredibly slim, that such a radical step would be a last resort for the moderate cleric. And without his green light, I’m told, none of the other leaders would declare without him – except, possibly, Muqtada, who doesn’t have the authority to declare official jihad but could incite, if he chose, a dangerous uprising. Abu Saduk told me that such a decision would be made by many Shiite clerics working together.
I asked at what point he felt it would be time for a Shiite leader to discuss a unified resistance against the occupation. “I can’t put a date,” he said. “Maybe tomorrow, maybe six months.”
Ostensibly, Sistani does not want an Iranian-modeled theocracy. And Abu Saduk told me that a Shiite-led government in Iraq would not look like Iran. But even if the clergy stayed out of the government, it’s likely that Shiite policymakers would ultimately follow Sistani’s dictates. And a shift toward Islamic law (if not Islamic government) would likely be the result. As Abu Saduk told me, Shiites wish to have a government of “God Justice” – in other words, one that enforces Islamic law. Much as I respected Abu Saduk, I desperately hope he does not get his way.
A few weeks ago, a portion of the Iraqi Governing Council quietly voted to replace Iraq’s existing family law, which is secular, with sharia – Islamic law governing domestic issues. The vote means nothing without ratification by American Proconsul Paul Bremer, but as an indicator of what might happen in the future, it’s very disturbing. Sharia puts decisions regarding issues such as divorce, marriage and inheritance in the hands of Muslim or Christian clergy, endangering rights that women have under family law.