General SCOTUS stuff

Were any trucks actually harmed in the making of the strike? The articles I have seen only refer to some concrete which had to be disposed of, and not any trucks that were damaged. E.g.:

At the appointed hour for the onset of the strike, the drivers drove their trucks back to the company’s headquarters and walked off the job. For those whose trucks had already been loaded with cement but who had not yet made deliveries, they left their trucks running so the cement wouldn’t instantly harden inside the trucks’ drums. The company, however, was unable to deliver the cement and some of it hardened, requiring it be destroyed and carted away. The strike lasted one week before the parties reached agreement on a new contract.

and

Because Local 174 coordinated the strike to occur during Glacier’s prime concrete delivery time, many drivers’ trucks were full of concrete during the strike. Several of the striking drivers returned their trucks to Glacier’s local concrete site without emptying them or notifying Glacier about the undelivered concrete. The remaining workers at Glacier hastily removed the concrete from the trucks before it could solidify and damage the trucks. The undelivered concrete, left to harden, could not be salvaged for sale.

That reporting suggests the whole case is based on a lie; that the workers took deliberate care to ensure the trucks were not damaged by he hardened cement.

I would think that since only the cement was harmed, and not the equipment, the court would find in favor of the union, based on the prior cases.

I think that’s Susan Collins’ take as well.

Of course, the court will observe precedent. Stare decisis, my friends.

If they’re going by prior cases, then the question of the cement doesn’t matter at all. Federal preemption prevents the company from suing without the NLRB first giving them the okay.

Going back to your restaurant example, overturning this would allow the restaurant to immediately sue their staff’s union for the spoiled food. Where normally a government official could just throw out the restaurant’s excuse (“They knowingly waited until Lobsterfest!”), now the union has to spend resource to fight a court case. It’ll be the opening move for the company after any strike and the threat of it will be used to scare workers.

Bingo. If businesses can sue unions, then they will do so. All the time. For harms such as existing on a day that ends in “Y”.

I think that this case is narrower than you are suggesting here.

This case appears to be arguing that certain, specific behavior pre-empts the NLRA. Looking at the Cornell page, I think the behavior they are arguing is not protected, would not necessarily transfer to a simple strike by restaurant workers.

In the case we have here, you had workers who had loaded trucks, and then left them in a state which would destroy property.

I think that to apply to a restaurant situation, it would be like if workers took a bunch of food out of the freezer with the intention of leaving before dealing with it, with the direct intention of destroying that food.

I think that saying such conduct is not protected (which seems to already be an established thing) didn’t prohibit all strikes. It would simply mean that you would need to finish a shift before you go on strike. That is, if you load your truck that day, you need to finish the delivery, you can’t intentionally take actions to destroy property.

In the restaurant example, you wouldn’t be able to take a bunch of stuff out of the freezer and leave, but you wouldn’t be obligated to come back to work the next day.

It seems like it is reasonable to say that actions which causes economic hardship simply by virtue of demonstrating what would happen without your labor are different than actions which are specifically intended to destroy your employer’s property.

Of course, they would also need to prove that was the intent.

Are you trying to give Alito a chub?

This seems to not really be true. The workers left the mixers running so the concrete would not harden, and other workers then dumped the concrete. There doesn’t seem to be any intent to damage the trucks, and in fact the trucks were not damaged.

The proving it, and where, is the problem.

Right now the business and union have to prove whether the strike was protected to the NLRB. The NLRB acts as an arbitrator. This prevents a costly court case for the union that gives an advantage to the employer.

This decision would allow the business to sue if the business thinks the strike was unprotected, removing the NLRB, and then the business and union need to fight it out in court. It’s in the employer’s interest to just sue no matter what and make the union spend the money to prove that it was a valid strike.

I think that this will be a matter for the court to decide, but the claim is that they intended to destroy the property, by just leaving the trucks and not trying anyone about them.

Ultimately, I do not know what the truth of the matter is.

Isn’t it already established by prior case law that business can sue if the actions aren’t protected?

I thought that this was about whether this particular action was considered protected or not.

Yes, you can sue if the NLRB says the strike was not protected. They sued before the NLRB said that. What these guys did with the concrete doesn’t really matter, this shouldn’t have had standing based on the supreme court’s past decisions.

It seems that the dispute in this case is based on the previous SCOTUS case that says that you can’t sue if the action is “arguably protected”, but that the company is arguing that it’s actually not arguably protected since previous NLRB decisions stated that employees going on strike had to take precautions against destruction of employee property.

WHETHER STRATEGICALLY-TIMED STRIKES ARE “ARGUABLY PROTECTED” UNDER THE NLRA

Glacier maintains that the striking drivers intentionally destroyed Glacier’s property by leaving the concrete to harden in the trucks. Glacier argues that because intentional property destruction is not “arguably protected,” preemption is not required in this case under the Garmon rule, which states a claim is preempted by the NLRA when it involves conduct that is “arguably protected” under the NLRA. Glacier contends that the “arguably” language in Garmon requires Local 174 to show that the NLRB could decide in its favor. According to Glacier, a mere “conclusory assertion” does not suffice to show that an activity is arguably protected; instead, Glacier argues that Local 174 must show that its interpretation of the NLRA is not “plainly contrary” to the NLRA’s text and has not been “authoritatively rejected” by courts or the NLRB.

Glacier maintains Local 174 cannot meet this burden. First, Glacier points to the language of the NLRA and argues that protecting intentional destruction of property does not align with the Act’s goal: encouraging collective bargaining. According to Glacier, “concerted activity” should be interpreted in light of the specific activities mentioned in the NLRA. Glacier contends that because the mentioned activities are all “lawful, orderly, and nondestructive” activities, tortious activities––such as destroying concrete––fall outside the scope of concerted activities and are not preempted. Second, Glacier argues that precedent makes it clear that employees have no right under the NLRA to engage in unlawful conduct. Although Glacier concedes striking is a lawful activity, it maintains that employees cannot deliberately time a strike to maximize property damage and then claim NLRA protection. Glacier asserts that the NLRB itself has recognized that striking employees must take “reasonable precautions” to avoid damage to their employer’s property. Glacier claims that where, as here, employees intentionally destroy property through a strategically timed strike, they are not taking reasonable precautions.

So the case seems like it hinges on this aspect.

The union obviously is arguing that their actions actually are arguably protected, and it seems like different courts have gone back and forth on this.

But there the company is interpreting what the NLRB considers “arguably protected” for the NLRB. And the NLRB eventually did make a decision, and they said the union engaged in protected conduct. Preemption means the federal regulator gets to make these decisions, not a state court.

This is just another case of what happened with the FDA, where conservatives are using the current court to remove a regulator’s enforcement mechanisms and putting them in a purely advisory role.

Well, it seems like they are asking the court.

It seems like the NLRB issued a slightly different decision, based on the argument by the union.

Local 174 counters that, by issuing a complaint against Glacier, the NLRB General Counsel signaled the NLRB’s belief that Local 174’s conduct was “actually protected” under the NLRA. According to Local 174, this makes it certain that the striking drivers’ actions were at least “arguably protected.”

And then glacier is making a counter argument:

Finally, Glacier contends it is inconsequential that the NLRB General Counsel issued a complaint against Glacier for unfair labor practices after the Washington Supreme Court found preemption. Glacier argues that the complaint amounts to an “unreasonable” assertion of a “regional director” and is insufficient to rebut the text of the NLRA and legal precedent.

Now, again, it does seem like even if the corporation wins this, it’s not really going to apply to all strikes, just ones that are engaging in illegal activity, as that seems to be the argument being made by glacier.

Going on strike at Starbucks, for instance, doesn’t seem like it would meet the same bar in terms of not being “arguably protected”, as it seems like glacier is saying that this isn’t protected because it’s obviously not protected.

Now, whether it is or not, that’s kind of up to the court to decide.

This strike involved illegal activity according to Glacier, and Glacier alone. Of course Starbucks and every other company will say, “hey would you look at that, our workers are also striking illegally.”

And that’s why we have courts, to decide these things.

Yes, that’s the conservative argument. Regulators shouldn’t have enforcement power, everything should be decided by a court. I think we’ve hit bedrock here.

Is it really “conservative” to think that the courts are needed to make decisions?

I mean, what would be the alternative?

Certainly, regulatory agencies need to be bound by law, right? Their power is limited. I don’t think you would want it to be otherwise, right?

And honestly, it seems like in this case, the argument seems to not even be against the NLRB or it’s power.