…preventing the United States from being seen as an aggressor would have required a comprehensive game plan.
Actually, this would have required a bag of faerie dust, since Chirac, Schroeder, Putin, and others have made it explicitly clear that they would have opposed military intervention in Iraq under any circumstances.
This reticence has little to do with Saddam and everything to do with counterbalancing American power.
Fourth, the belated effort to achieve a second Security Council resolution could still have succeeded, had the United States been willing to compromise by extending the deadline by just a few weeks.
Rubin’s points 1-3 are debatable, but Point 4 is an outright fantasy.
One of the main sources of European skepticism toward the U.S. campaign in Iraq was the sense that Washington was determined to go to war regardless of what Saddam did.
When Hans Blix described Iraq’s Dec. 8 declaration as “wholly inadequate,” one might have assumed that the UN was well on its way to concluding that Saddam was not interested in complying with Security Council ultimatums. One would have been wrong, of course.
Above all, it was the belief that the military buildup in the Persian Gulf was driving the United States’ policy decisions that led many to conclude war was inevitable.
Excellent point – because once it became obvious that war was inevitable, that was FGR’s [France, Germany, Russia’s] cue to obstruct the UN process as egregiously as possible, earning the contempt of even Colin Powell. The purpose of this obstructionism was to isolate the US; the decision had nothing to do with any moral business.
The administration simply did not care very much whether it had international backing or not, and the Europeans knew it.
Couldn’t agree more. America and Britain stepped forward to enforce international law, primarily as a matter of specific self-defense and secondarily as a simple matter of being the only nations with the capability and will to do it. That other European countries obstructed this effort should come as no surprise to folks like Zbigniew Brzesinzki, who noted in 1999 that “France will play a role on the international stage much along the lines of the role Gary Payton plays in the NBA – a good but unexceptional player taunting the league’s superstars.”
The unanimous passage of Resolution 1441 in November of last year had masked a number of major differences among key members of the UN Security Council.
Chief among these differences is the fact that FGR were unwilling to support military intervention under any cicrumstances.
Washington, however, was caught flat-footed by these developments [partial compliance by Iraq], and the result was disastrous.
TIME OUT – How can Rubin possibly claim this? “Partial compliance” was the exact reason that Washington did not want to go to the UN in the first place. It was assumed that Saddam would stall, prevaricate, and otherwise confound the effort to fully determine the status of his WMD programs. Washington knew all along that Rubin’s “fourth scenario” was the one that would actually come about.
Above all, it was the so-called preemptive strike doctrine, published in last September’s National Security Strategy, that harmed America’s diplomatic cause. Viewed through this lens, the war in Iraq looked less like a way to uphold UN Security Council resolutions than like the manifestation of a new American approach.
Now we get to the heart of the matter. FGR’s intransigence post-1441 had nothing to do with 1441 or any other Security Council resolution or lack thereof, but with a simple desire to obstruct US foreign policy prima facia once it became clear that US foreign policy meant business now.
Much of the world became determined to prevent the Security Council from rubber-stamping American decisions to conduct preemptive strikes.
Deeper into the heart of the matter. “Rubber-stamping American decisions” is the way FGR describes the enforcement of UN resolutions aimed at controlling the WMD programs of unaccountable regimes.
The real surprise was that the world’s democracies did not see the importance of upholding UN disarmament demands or ending the misery of the Iraqi people.
Amen.
Public diplomacy is supposed to persuade, not infuriate.
At last, after flirting with the heart of the matter – we reach the aorta. The world opposed the war in Iraq because the US was not polite/humble enough in asking for it. This is Rubin’s essential thesis, and I agree with it whole-heartedly. The rest, as they say, is academic.
As a result of Paris’ position, many Iraqis continue to associate France with the hated Saddam regime…
As well they should.
To be fair, the administration had compelling rationales for war beyond the threat of Iraqi WMD…But each of these arguments, although perhaps otherwise convincing, were undermined by the administration’s record or reputation.
I’m surprised McCullough linked to this. I’m impressed with Rubin. He understands, quite perceptively, that the world was unwilling to back US action because Bush & Co. were the pitchmen for that action. The intransigence and obstructionism had nothing to do with the case, and everything to do with disdain for the lawyer.