Well, there’s this mythology about the Western Desert, born partially of the desolate, empty nature of the place, and from the relatively low unit density, as well I think out of the fact that between the fall of France and the arrival of the Americans in November, 1942 with the TORCH landings, this was pretty much the only place the Commonwealth folks were able to do much other than retreat. And there is of course the romanticism of the Afrika Korps, Rommel, the Desert Rats, and all that, coupled with good old fashioned Orientalism (in the Edward Said meaning of the term); after all, Egypt and all that.
Part of this mythology, which of course has bits of reality mixed in with the nostalgia, is that the war in the desert was “clean,” with no civilians to worry about, no cities to sack, just fighting men matched up mano a mano in a sort of Hemingway or Boys’ Life-esque test of wills. Sort of like the baloney about WWI air combat, and just as bogus. But because on a map it looks like you get these sweeping movements of armored units to and fro, leading the more colorful accounts of battles to liken them to naval engagements and stuff like that. So it’s likely the author of this review was influenced by this sort of popular History Channel interpretation of events, coupled with a misunderstanding of blitzkrieg concepts and application.
I’m not anywhere near an expert on blitzkrieg, but it sure seems that the desert war wasn’t a terribly good place for the sort of thing Guderian did. The types of objectives, the combined arms, the type of enemies blitzkrieg was designed to combat, all of that seems absent. The desert war was often fluid (though oddly enough, most of the battles seemed to revolve around getting dug in troops out of where their holes were, go figure), but it wasn’t terribly similar to France or Poland or what not.