One of the designers posted this in response to a player saying he thought bringing down a B-17 might be too hard in the game:
Well, I’m glad you find it difficult. If you posted that it was too easy, I’d be worried.
A ballistic study of German fighter attacks against heavy bombers was published in 1950. It was based on U.S. Army records, which were of modest value, and on Luftwaffe reports and post-war interviews with a German operations analyst whose job it was during the war to assess German attacks on bombers. The German material and interviews were of high value for the study. The study analyzed many factors including but not limited to aircraft type, experience of pilots, angle of attack, distance between fighter and bomber at moment of burst, weapon type, aiming error, so on and so forth. The data was collected during the war, in the form of anecdotes by pilots and film taken by cameras attached to the underside of aircraft. During the war, German analysts studied the film with deliberation, developing diagrams and statistical tables from them. It’s also clear from the interviews that the analysts applied a healthy dose of skepticism to their data, which I think makes the report even more useful.
That said, I’ll cut to the chase: When Bf109s made what the report refers to as a “rear hemisphere attack,” in game terms an attack from the tail position, the bomber suffered significant damage one time out of thirteen attacks. That is, the German pilot had a 1 in 13 chance of doing real harm to the bomber. And here’s your bonus fact for the day: the rear hemisphere attack was the most reliable angle of attack.
In 1942, there were several problems facing the German pilot. First, his machine was outgunned by the bomber. That meant he had to close in tight to make the attack, 400 meters or closer. The 1 in 13 ratio only applies to pilots who closed in to that range, and 50 percent closed to between 200 and 330 meters. Compared to duels against Spitfires, where typical range was 500 meters, the pilot had to get in closer, and that meant enduring return fire from a tail gunner wielding a .50 caliber. In 1943 the Bf109 pilot would be equipped with heavier caliber guns, and a greater number of guns, allowing him to increase the range of attack and increase the time of burst (more ammo). The bomber would also enjoy its upgrades.
The range of attack in 1942 was complicated by the newness of the B-17. It was bigger than what German pilots were used to. Because of its size, first time encounters often led German pilots to make their burst too soon, at too distant a range, because they were under the impression that they were closer to the target than they were. The 360 arc of defensive fire was also new. Bf109 pilots, and crews of larger German aircraft, had learned the blind spots of various British aircraft, but with the size and large crew of the heavy U.S. bombers, there was no safe angle, just angles of attack that were more or less lethal.
In SAtR, Mark and I tried to make a game out of this. We did not build 1 in 13 into the game as a constant norm, but we did create a game where 1 in 13 can indeed be the story of a mission. There are randomizers, dice and cards, and there are decisions.
The player has a set of factors to consider. There is the angle of attack: nose, oblique, tail. Altitude is part of the formula too; level attacks are the most reliable. Then mode, which is a catch all for range and less tangible factors such as the steadiness of the approach. There are numbers to consider. Do you send in a single fighter, do you send them in as a rotte, do you send them in from a variety of angles? Do you attack from multiple angles simultaneously, or do you conserve your assets and make consecutive attacks? Do you have pilots will extraordinary skills? If so, how will you use them, and when?
In 1942, you are likely to experience missions where your pilots come away with nothing. They’ll make a few passes, maybe damage a bomber or two, maybe not. The trick is maximizing whatever advantages you may have and making the most of the mission. Earning Staffel Experience Points is vital to the success of a Campaign, because they will allow you to make Staffel Commands that give you a leg up. More fighters, for example. Even if you don’t score VP, the mission can be chalked up as a learning experience for your staffel (hence the experience points). By late 1943, the Luftwaffe’s higher-ups (air district commanders and above) had concluded that they required large numbers of fighters to strike the U.S. bomber formations, and they persuaded Goring and Hitler to strip the east front and other theaters. The number of German fighters at home doubled, which left the front vulnerable (but that’s somebody else’s problem).
In later Campaigns, you will enjoy more assets. Bombs and rockets can have a devastating impact on the combat box. If playing a Medium or Full Campaign starting in 1942, you just need to hang on long enough to get to 1943. It’s hard to win in '42, but it is much easier in late '43. There, the challenge is achieving a Decisive Victory. (Yeah, good luck with that.)
One last thing. When I noted the 1 in 13 probability, I neglected to mention that the data was culled only from the most successful pilots. The German analysts understood that their data was skewed, which means the real probability was less than 1 in 13. How much less? I don’t know, and from what I’ve read, nobody else does either. There is a lot that we will never know about what actually went on up there. To say the encounters between aircraft was dynamic is an understatement. Unlike other battlefields, there was no way to take post-action recon photos to assess damage, and recreating the train of events involved guesswork and required ample skepticism. Many gaps in knowledge could not be filled. Confusion may not have been a constant state, but it was tapping at every pilot’s shoulder. Encounters between fighters and bombers lasted seconds and reports varied wildly depending on point of view, even of observers and participants on the same side. I mention all this to confess that Mark and I fully expect some folks to take issue with our design choices. This is our take on what happened up there, and we are comfortable with the range of outcomes the model generates, knowing that some folks may favor alternate interpretations. We also understand that for a solitaire game to deliver, there must be a feeling of challenge. We just hope that challenge here does not feel unobtainable. Hopefully, after a few plays, you will find that your fighters can knock a bomber or two out of formation. At the very least.
