There is a great scene in Pontecorvo’s Battle of Algiers where Col. Matthieu I think it is is holding a press conference to show off the capture of Ben M’hidi, After M’hidi is led away (having nearly stolen the show), the colonel addresses the reporters, who are peppering him with questions about torture. He bluntly says something to the effect of “There is really only one question. Do you wish to retain Algeria? If you do, you have to agree to the cost, which includes torture. It’s up to you (meaning France). We (the military) will do what you tell us to, but you should not have any illusions about what your’e asking us to do.”
Of course, I rather doubt that the senior French military leadership was anywhere close to as open and realistic as this semi-fictional regimental commander.
It is doubly remarkable in that the movie is one of the great examples of sixties Euro-Marxist film-making. I won’t call it propaganda because it’s an amazing (and amazingly balanced, all things considered) film, and because the original version as pitched by Yacef Saadi was, in fact, propaganda tripe (Saadi is the guy playing himself in the film, loosely fictionalized as Djafar, and who ended up in the post-independence Algierian government). Pontecorvo rejected it as being, well, crass and simplistic, and instead produced a film that, while clearly sympathetic to the cause of Algerian independence, refrained from glorifying the FLN and in fact managed to pose some very interesting questions about methods, motives, and the cost of victory.
Yeah, it is a very rare work in that it demonizes no one and attempts to humanize everyone. And avoids (or attempts to avoid) reductionist tropes (which can be propagandist) at every turn. That is the mark of a great film on history or conflict. One of the reasons I have such a love of it, The Thin Red Line, A Bridge Too Far, Cross of Iron, to name a few.
There was none of that going on in Germany. There was a lot of dissension and open rebellion in the General Staff. What you describe is a myth. Created by the “usual suspects”. As for the Bulge, it was a last gasp attempt to do something that could change the dynamics among the Western Allies. All knew that it was a long shot, but it had to be prosecuted with every ounce of will and determination even to stand a chance of working.
The German general staff in WW2 never fully came to terms with the fact Hitler was often correct and they mistaken, with his no retreat order in the first winter being just one example.
After reading much of the transcripts of the military conferences** I would assert Hitler was rather often far more level headed and competent militarily* than his staff portrayed him after the war.
*just to underline here the man was a monster and utterly evil, I am speaking purely about his military leadership.
Agree, with the caveat that the he whipsawed them frequently regarding political guidance. Choosing Russia as a target in Fall 1940 (doing a “120” if not a 180). Completely underestimating the political consequences of failure in the Mediterranean for Italy (and by extension Germany). It’s like he was decent at the oversight and “demanding Joint-ness” in approach part, but horrible at the “political guidance” part of his job.
Yeah, agreed good clarification, I would say Hitler did HIS own job terribly. I just think he did THEIR job better than they gave him credit for. If that makes sense?
His military interventions were, I would argue, often sounder than Churchill’s for example. But Churchill was a far superior strategic leader of a nation.
I was more excited about my Great White Fleet photos than my off hand comment about the zero – however, I still believe the Japanese plan (a six month strike war), the skill of their pilots, the pearl harbor operation (missing our carriors) was a recipe for success. And ok the zero had it’s flaws but in the hands of skilled pilots in the beginning of the war, it was better than most of what we had operational in the pacific.
My point, above, is that should that 6 month (or 9 month) plan work that plane would have been instrumental.
I am not sure sitting here now when hellcats, corsairs, p-38s came on line.
BTw we dropped a lotta zeros before that. They kept their veterans in the battle while we pulled them out to train. That may have made the difference.
We were caught flat-footed, they had the surprise strategic advantage and right before midway numerical. I am still not convinced I am wrong.
Scott by the turkey shoot we are talking many months later. I am thinking you may not considering the complete early package. The IJN was set to win a relatively quick war fast and for that plan to succeed they needed to cripple us at pearl, take what they could everywhere else, answer our threat (coral sea) and then progress to offensive capabilities that set us off balance (midway --Aleutians).
Yamamoto could have been wrong.
Quite frankly I think the US Navy got freaking lucky as hell (with great intel … ) at the greatest naval battle we ever had. My thoughts are it was luck. Intel skill. And some grit. But certainly they had the advantage in numbers, equipment (you all know they were light years ahead of us In carrier launches?), and basic tactical/strategic planning.
None of that matters when Nineteen of these were being bought in January 1942.
You are contrarian, but you aren’t right. :) Midway wasn’t a miracle. It was an inevitability. The Japanese were going to take losses eventually… Losses they couldn’t replace. Yamamoto knew this. That’s why he wasn’t wrong.
He may have been wrong. They only had losses they couldn’t replace because we figured out how to decipher their code and dive bomb their carriers. Lol which happened to (luckily) have their refueling on deck.
It was luck. And some grit, and some smarts, and some good people …. but…
Certainly not the thinking in Congress at the WH and in the War and Navy Departments in January 1942 when they decided to appropriate the cash for 19 Essexes.
This is a game of Risk fantasy. Any danger posed to the Australian mainland is questionable at best, but any threat was put to rest at Coral Sea. In fact Coral Sea really ended any serious threat to US-Australian supply lines. There would never e a “retreat to Pearl”, whatever that means.
I won’t way anything else on the matter here. You can believe what you want to believe, but you aren’t interested in listening to anyone else on this issue. People have cited multiple works of scholarship on the matter, but have received no consideration from you. You’ve got your beliefs and you shall drive on with them. I say, Godspeed, KG! :)
Aw Pm I almost take that as a compliment! Sure I am stubborn but I love arguing with you! Even if I am positive you are wrong. Have a good night yourself!
And at least you are super polite about it. You almost had me convinced a moment ago…
