Grognard Wargamer Thread!

Games
5370

Love this photo! And dont let these grogs shout you down :) Stand your ground I say!

Happily I know very little about the subject what I would offer to the debate is I think the Imperial Japanese decision to start a second war while still not finished with a land war in China is reminiscent of Nazi Germany’s attack east. These are gambling regimes who can never quit when they are ahead.

It also brings to mind successful aggression in the 20th and 21st century. Which often came in the form of the coup de main, the bold stroke. But it runs out of steam, so quitting and taking your winnings fast and ending the war you started in a timely manner is key.

Was Japan wise enough to pick that right moment ?

Which makes me think of soviet and modern Russian military doctrine as a very good one for the weaker side economically.

Ok probably none of that helps :) but I was enjoying reading the discussion and wanted to contribute.

5371

Thx Rod! There is as much authorities that say one thing that says the other, And PM is a polite opponent that sadly for ME knows his stuff very well.

My only point (thx for the thx on the photos who doesn’t like a clip from the great white fleet?) was that Midway was NOT inevitable. We got freaking lucky. Plus we had some great people there that could see us through (intel, pilots, Spruance, Nimitz, and a bunch antiquated planes – plus a lotta gasoline at just the right moment on some carrier tops)

I am pretty sure if we were playing a game of resources in Total War or something back in 1941 the US would have been crushing people. Sadly that wasn’t how it was. We almost lost the West coast to an aggressive IJN. Or at least scared us into submission. And we are lucky they didn’t succeed. (edited for I believe to be more political correctness)

5372

The Aleutians hardly counts as threatening to take the west coast though.

Side note, my grandfather was sent there. So a battle I have extra interest in.

Anyhow the whole concept comes down to the fundamental problem of logistics. If you posit that Japan could have won, then the question is how? Because technological and numerical superiority only goes so far. The Pacific is a big place, and there is only so many viable paths across. There’s a reason we did the island hopping, so how does Japan threaten the mainland?

Option one involves going through Alaska and downward from there. Problem is they tried that, and were repelled. If that’s the plan, it already failed.

Option two involves taking Hawaii. And Pearl Harbor would have been their best chance. If they truly wanted to threaten the west coast, why not do a full on invasion after achieving strategic objectives there? You have the surprise and we’re able to do good damage, aside from the carriers being out to sea, an invasion right then is their best chance.

Because if you want to roll technological and numerical superiority but supply and resource deficiency into a victory through aggressive surprise, well, half measures won’t do.

So I can’t really take an occupation, or even serious threat, to the American coast as a realistic option.

Any attempt without either occupying or disabling Pearl Harbor leaves a massive vulnerability to their supply lines in their flank. Any attempt to occupy Pearl Harbor had best chance of succeeding immediately post bombing.

I don’t see another viable option, other than the one they tried, which is to dominate and reinforce the South Pacific as best they could. Which they did. And they still lost the war. Because the reality is that even if the US loses Midway, they are better able to absorb those losses and replace. Because there was never a serious threat to the US mainland. The US could fall back to Pearl and regroup much more easily than Japan could push on and attack.

Now perhaps India or Australia would have felt the pinch more. But with China I don’t see invasion or occupation of either area as even a slightly plausible outcome. And that alternate history could certainly change the how and when of the peace signed. But not the why, the why was almost certainly always going to be because Japan conceded.

5373

IJN takes midway – we fortress at Hawaii. Then they eliminate threats while we build all this Essex class carriers.

Honestly I think we would all love to agree, (and Crag I agree with almost all of what you said).

But the Japanese at that time did Not agree.

(almost except for the idea that it was inevitable that the US would win)

I stand by my principal point: Midway was more luck than American domination. If we had lost there we would be back at Hawaii. And we were fighting the best aerial combat carrier arms (both fighter/bomber/torpedo) in the world at that time. And the zero = the original topic of this discussion --with the pilots at that time === was the better fighter. This actually brings honor to our pilots that flew those F4f-3 wildcats.

Btw as we argue about this a bit it makes the Battle of Coral Sea maybe more relevant. We cannot ignore that. Kidō Butai was regrouping in Japan after… offensive action was a given.

5374

And Imperium Romanum III is released.

It will sadly take a while to cross the pond, but I’m planning to get it when it does (love the map already). With this, the Ancient Wars series and the 2 Berg Ancient World games (Rise of the Roman Republic and Carthage) I can now compare the three operational ancient systems I’ve heard most about.

But why is it 3 maps? My wall setup only holds 2 mappers so far. Will have to print a reduced size map…

5375

Great posts.

I agree we should be cautious assigning an inevitability to either battle victory or strategic, and I didn’t mean for that to come across in my post about the Zero; more a snippet of how the US pilots and technology initially tried to adapt and eventually took superiority, and the interesting tidbit about the aircraft.

I agree with you that at a strategic level we shouldn’t say the Japanese were doomed to defeat; I feel that does a disservice to the people that fought, the casualties, and decisions later in war. Sure in hindsight it is true, but a million things could have gone differently in the minds of the people at the time, which could have resulted in differences such as a less total victory with negative long-term consequences. The true source of victory was arguably the will to see it through properly, thank FDR for that I suppose. I’ll look into Midway, I know the gist of it but could learn more, thanks.

5376

There was a U.S. intelligence trap that forced the Japanese to attack us or face utter destruction at the worst possible moment. The entire “Pacific War” was engineered by Roosevelt and “his staff” to get us into the war in Europe… no other reason. No matter what they did – and they did a lot – they couldn’t get Hitler to attack them. They made certain the Japanese had no alternative but to attack us. This is not widely known for obvious reasons. The Pacific War was wholly unnecessary but started BY THE U.S., not Japan.

5377

Before 9-11 Conspiracy theories, before New World Order Conspiracy theories, before JFK conspiracy theories there was…

The Pearl Harbor Conspiracy theory. The Grandaddy of 'em all.

5378

Yeah, I could buy the US had knowledge the Japanese were planning something thanks to signal intelligence, but that’s as far as I can go before we are talking crazy, imho.

5379

And that’s all they knew. “Planning something”. Everyone assumed it was a surprise attack on Manila/Philippines (from a US standpoint).

Still the definitive work on the topic.

https://www.amazon.com/At-Dawn-We-Slept-Revised-ebook/dp/B00NGZB2GW

Excellent work in terms “who screwed up”:

https://www.amazon.com/Pearl-Harbor-Gordon-W-Prange-ebook/dp/B00JOW20SU/ref=pd_sim_351_2?_encoding=UTF8&pd_rd_i=B00JOW20SU&pd_rd_r=65fc75ac-e4fe-11e8-b79c-c9a1aeb9fccc&pd_rd_w=Uh7B8&pd_rd_wg=TSRY9&pf_rd_i=desktop-dp-sims&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_p=18bb0b78-4200-49b9-ac91-f141d61a1780&pf_rd_r=7CFME6E080DVHGTPE16T&pf_rd_s=desktop-dp-sims&pf_rd_t=40701&psc=1&refRID=7CFME6E080DVHGTPE16T

5380

Lohengrin’s theory is not totally off base, though. There’s a lot of truth to some of the basic concepts, though I have serious doubts about much of the rest of it.

The USA certainly understood that blocking Japan in the Pacific, and in particular interfering in Japan’s attempt to conquer China, would in all probability lead to war at some point. For very good reasons I think, we did not want Imperial Japan to have control of the Asian mainland, and also for at least quite logical reasons felt that we were a Pacific power and would ultimately be harmed by Japanese hegemony over the region. Our policy of diplomatic and economic challenges to Japan, which gradually ratcheted up the costs of their actions through restrictions on resources primarily, were rather effective. FDR and his foreign policy staff knew that there would come a point where the Japanese could not accept this stuff; they hoped it would come at a time when the USA was psychologically as well as militarily prepared to deal with the Japanese response.

This is happening independent of what is going on in Europe, considering the US has had a strong economic interest in China since the 18th century and, closer to the WWII time frame, the Japanese had been mucking about in mainland Asia since around 1931 (earlier if you go back to their acquisition of Korea c. 1910). After the 1937 Sino-Japanese War began in earnest, we were fully committed to challenging the Japanese in Asia and the Pacific, albeit at a fairly modest level at first. Once things started to go pear shaped in Europe, yes, the FDR administration developed a growing sense of the need to back the UK (and France before it went kerplop), even though there was much less certainty among most business and government interests. At some level, I’d agree Roosevelt dearly desired a way to commit the USA to support the UK in the 1940-41 time frame. I’m even willing to accept that, at some level, the administration held out hope that the continuing crisis with Japan might be something that would provide a way for us to do that (largely I suppose based on what had to be seen as an off-chance that Hitler would dive in to help his supposed allies in Asia).

What I can’t see is some grand plan to leverage the inevitable Japanese response to our containment efforts to provoke the Germans into giving us an entry into the European war. For one thing, that decision by Germany was by no means predestined, nor was it terribly smart. The best bet before hand would have been that Hitler would have paid lip-service to the Japanese but would have halted short of declaring war on the USA (which gained him absolutely zilch). The war in the Pacific was pretty much inevitable given that the USA was categorically, unequivocally, and absolutely opposed to Japanese hegemony in Asia, and would have had to respond militarily at some point. Did FDR push the Japanese to the point where they had to act, knowing we’d take a hit somehow, somewhere? I think that’s a reasonable assumption, though I suspect the administration rather hoped they’d have more warning and would be able to mount a more effective defense than they did, given that the fact of an attack would have been just as useful in terms of mobilizing support for a war with Japan as a disaster like Pearl Harbor.

The idea that the US could have avoided fighting Japan, given Japan’s utter unwillingness or inability to abandon its attempt to control China and the rest of Asia, is what is impossible to believe.

5381

Saying Roosevelt wanted the US in the war against Germany to back the Allies has truth
to it.

This is a conspiracy theory with no basis in fact. It has been debunked, via exhaustive research and analysis multiple times. I urge anyone interested to read the above fine, exhaustive histories on the matter. I certainly have no desire to debate it further as I have been through that particular looking glass too many times already to lend it my psychic and intellectual energy (similar to my stance on debating "Japan Coulda won! California coulda been invaded! " Spielberg 1941 theories on Japanese capabilities and intentions in 1942).

Godspeed!

https://thumbs.gfycat.com/AnimatedAltruisticBunting-size_restricted.gif

5382

When you unequivocally say “none of that going on in Germany,” in a state where there was a failed coup followed by the army backing Hitler (and not the plotters) and a war that literally ended with the destruction of a capital city with opposing troops taking it by force as opposed to a military takeover with a negotiated peace, I just can’t take what you say seriously on this.

Seriously. “Open rebellion in the General Staff.” Open rebellion. lulz

People bitching about things in private while nervously looking around does not count as “open rebellion.” Nor does ignoring some select orders in the final days of the war, when you realize they’re unlikely to get to you any more.

Or did I miss the part of history where the General Staff openly rebelled, and refused to attack in the West in Winter 44, and there was no Courland Pocket, the Stalingrad breakout started earlier enough due to ignoring Hitlers orders, the remilitarization of the Rhineland was refused and Hitler was deposed, etc.

5383

Disagreeing with people based on no evidence is more a sign of ignorance.

5384

I’m sorry, but you apparently have no idea what you’re talking about. I said open rebellion, I didn’t exactly say when, but that’s another discussion. If you’re up in arms about that concept, well, you don’t know what you’re talking about.

5385

As for the U.S. contriving the entire Japanese attack, do some “research” (i.e., not reading conventional histories, which have been whitewashed for good reason) into the Purple Machine, and the Portuguese communications.

And once you learn the answers, ask yourself the question again: “Happily I know very little about the subject what I would offer to the debate is I think the Imperial Japanese decision to start a second war while still not finished with a land war in China is reminiscent of Nazi Germany’s attack east.”

The only intelligent answer is that they didn’t. They both had knowledge – either valid or what they believed to be valid – that they were going to be attacked when they were most vulnerable, leaving their only hope a preemptive strike against their scheming enemy.

5386

Facts and conclusions can be discussed. Beliefs, however brook no real debate.

5387

[Insert really vague, absolutist, conclusive statements] you don’t know what you’re talking about.

At this point, I assume this is some type of gimmick/troll thing. I have no idea what it is trying to do, but I’ll stop engaging with it.

5388

Thank you. People who don’t know what they’re talking about shouldn’t be trying to debate that point.

5389

“Ignorance” or maybe being guilty of being a bad lawyer…