I thought college campuses were an automatic -10 penalty to the gun culture stat? What they’re saying is that if the VT guy had tried that in a Piggly Wiggly off-campus, then there wouldn’t have been a massacre to speak of!
So it turns out that nobody I knew was hurt, although the mother and grandmother of an ex-girlfriend were shopping only about a mile away from someplace that got shot up.
Dude, -10 to gun culture in VA is still a net +40 compared to gun culture in CA!
-Tom
You realize that a predoctoral fellow is someone who just graduated from college, but hasn’t started grad school, right? So you’re basically referencing someone’s senior thesis as authoritative. It’s an interesting idea, but hardly accepted wisdom at this point.
One incident among dozens. The odds do not support your argument.
They’d still be praying that the gunmen would spare their lives.
Oh, now we’ve moved from the US to Israel. Israel is the way it is because it is such a relatively small country. You can’t possibly compare what they do with what might be possible in a country with a population the size of India.
Whatever. Please continue to argue about VT, where grown adults who have passed CCW requirements STILL are not allowed to carry, as proof that a CCW can’t “thwart” anything. That situation definitely proves something. Just not what you think.
Sure, but it fits what I know of the data better than the other explanations. It’s also got the grand unified theory thing going on where it explains all these previously strange little details.
…and that research/comment is not exactly new to the theory community. I’ve read similar before, elsewhere.
And even so, I think it’s wrong when it comes to Islamic terrorists. It definitely applies to political terrorists, but what possible political goal is there in the Mumbai attacks? There were no demands, no statements. They were killing simply because they hate everyone who isn’t their kind of Muslim. Killing is their goal, the proof of their faith in Allah and the here-after, the proof of their salvation (in a circularly logical sort of way*) and an expression of perceived collective revenge.
The sometimes-exception to this can be found in Palestine where a political economy element crop up: suicide bomber families getting cash and support for their martyred child. But my pick is these guys will be educated and from relatively middle-class Pakistani backgrounds and they will have fallen in with extremists preachers for one reason or another and then radicalized. Lets not forget that LeT and friends have been doing this recruiting for years and years to the kids it has sent in to Kashmir and Afghanistan. This attack differs only in the extreme audacity. For every one of these guys there are dozens that have died shooting up Indian police stations, army posts, etc etc.
- The “success” of the attack proves Allah willed that it happen. This is what people forget about 9/11 in my mind. It was, of course, a demonstration to the West of extremist hatred, but it was also designed as a demonstration to Islam that Al Qaeda was on the right path and Allah backed their view of the world. The plan Mumbai plan was audacious. Audacious plans only happen with God’s approval. Therefore, India deserved it somehow. There isn’t a political message. It’s a religious war between Islam hard liners and moderates.
Well, at least the details that he mentions in support in that paper.
I doubt we’ll sit on our hands. American intervention (specifically Colin Powell’s diplomacy) is probably what saved India and Pakistan from a full-scale war in 2002. Neither of those countries’ governments can ever admit the common interest they share – not going to war. They will both look to the U.S. to help them quietly steer the pair of them from the brink.
My prediction: Large-scale thrashing of a Lashkar camp in Pakistan, credited to the Pakistani military. The real work will have been conducted by U.S. special forces, operating with expanded remit from Islamabad.
Stratfor had an interesting piece yesterday that basically argued that the situation is much different than 2002. India has basically looked the other way the last few years at various attacks that have originated from Pakistan mainly because they realize the Pakistani government can’t really do much about them and because India had no interest in a war with Pakistan. But they can’t ignore Mumbai because of the scale of it and thus the Indian government is going to have to demand something pretty significant. It will be hard for the US to broker a deal that satisfies India’s political requirements while not creating a crisis in Pakistan over what they have to allow, all at the same time the US needs Pakistan to remain focused on it’s anti-Taliban actions on the Afghan border. Plus this all has to be done by a lame duck US administration.
So, to think the unthinkable for a moment, what if (and I don’t think this terribly likely at the moment, thank goodness) India and Pakistan actually got into a shooting war?
Would India go after Pakistan’s nukes? Would Pakistan go after India’s? I assume we’re not talking about large numbers of weapons in hardened storage facilities, so much as relatively modest numbers relying on dispersal and garrisons for protection? Or are there a small number of super-fortified storage depots? Would going after nukes be a matter of commando raids, or conventional bombing, or would it mean pre-emptive nuclear attacks?
Or would both sides simply realize that the cost of attacking each other’s nuclear force was too high, and limit the conflict to conventional forces? While that might seem logical, I’d think India would squash Pakistan in a straight up conventional war; given that assumption (and again, only an assumption; anyone with more info please chime in) it might appeal to the Pakistanis to “use it or lose it.”
I really don’t think either side is dumb enough to go to war with the other, in a full-on way, but accidents do happen…
Previous wars (1965, 1971, Kargil) have been limited.
1947: Pakistan wins its independence after revolting. Kashmir split down the middle where the front was at the end of the war.
1965: Pakistan tries to take Kashmir and fails, starts a border war which neither side wins.
1971: Border clashes in Kashmir escalated into a wider conflict. The Pakistani army collapsed and surrendered. As a result, East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh. Note that neither India nor Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons during this war.
1999: Border clashes again in Kashmir (note a theme?) which Pakistan lost. Pakistan threatened to escalate to nuclear weapons, the US found out and stopped the war, hard. As a result the Pakistani government collapsed.
A 2008 or 2009 war would likely go the same way as the Kargil War, with Pakistan unable to defeat the numerically superior Indian forces and India unwilling to press that advantage in the face of world opinion and nuclear stalemate. The wild card would be if Pakistan (or India, if the Pakistanis managed somehow to win) manages to set off a nuke before anyone stops them; at that point it becomes far more than a footnote in a Wikipedia list.
The problem is that a full-scale war doesn’t solve India’s problems with the radicals. It would more likely create more radicals. Pakistan’s current government is too weak to shut down the radicals (as we’ve seen with the Taliban on the Afghan border) because it doesn’t really have full control over the Pakistani military or security/intelligence services.
That’s why it’s a scary situation. India has to do something to satisfy political reality inside their own country and if this government doesn’t do that a more nationalistic government will likely replace them. Pakistan can’t stop the radicals in their own country but can’t allow India unrestricted access to their territory to do it for them, nor would allowing the US to do it look good and it’s not clear Obama would be willing to involve the US directly under the circumstances. In some ways it is similar to the spark between Serbia and Austro-Hungary that started WWI, in that the two countries face a comparable situation. Serbian radicals assasinated the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, which required a major reaction. Serbia could only accept A-H demands up to a point without invalidating their own sovereignty.
As always, a cogent and very informative post from ya. Thanks!
I’m fairly well versed in the general history of conflict between the two nations, and I’d agree with you about the likely direction of any future conflict. The key of course is “likely.” Every time people get into one of these squabbles where prestige, face, or whatever you call it gets involved in ever-escalating degrees, the chance for something no one really wants occurring seems to increase.
I suspect that in this case the result may well be a loss of some of the progress in relations between India and Pakistan and a backslide towards a chillier relationship, but with luck no more than that (though that’s not encouraging in itself).
There is no equivalent to the Schliffen plan in place. A war between these two (even conventional, leave alone nukalar) offer no advantage for any of their allies. Pre-WWI Europe was a mess (a powder keg if you will) of interlocking alliances and massive “doomsday” military plans, that resulted in an irreversable mobilization and “race to the sea” (unfortunately for Schlieffen, Belgium turns out to make fierce fighters as well as delicious sweets and the Germany army was delayed long enough for France to protect Paris).
But I get what you are saying. I think its on Pakistan to show good faith. They might actually see this as an opportunity to use some covert US Ops to kill/capture some pesky militants and take credit for it. Saying that though, the attack on Indian parliment did escalate into a skirmish, so maybe restraint is too much to hope for.
We looked at that before (well, I remember Lizard King). The Pakistani military is highly, highly resistant to US ‘inteference’ in their territory. There is a risk they will open fire on US helicopters there whether Islamabad let the helis in or not, and they have done so+. As the military is essentially autonomous, the best option for the US is to act as a calm intermediary. Both sides want the same thing, but neither can really do anything to achieve it.
I still think the best option is allowing an Indian military encampment, moderately sized, close to the suspected areas of operation for a period of three years (and preferably no more). It gives the Indians some comfort, it allows the countries to try and work together. Absolutely no chance of it happening, of course, but that’s what I think.
As Lizard King says, crisis-> response is the last thing the US should be doing, because it has not served them well. Using US special forces is a bad move politically and, dare I say it, tactically. I really think they should stay out of this at least until the change of Presidency and focus on keeping the PMCs out.
+To my shame, I failed to follow up the story. Hopefully for me the politicians sank it quickly to the back-rooms.
No, it didn’t, though it was close. Both militaries mobilized and there were a few exchanges of fire across the border, but they stood down eventually (having just fought a war 3 years prior may have had a lot to do with it).
So far the attitudes of both nations aren’t nearly as confrontational as they were in 2001.