Thanks, but it feels like I’m just pissing into the wind and decided against posting it. (I’m trying to wean myself off political discussions, it just leaves me frustrated and angry. Obviously still a work in progress as I keep failing.)
I’ll post these two links though as counter data to the “ignoring rural voters” shtick that seems so prevalent.
Wisconsin’s turnout was about 66 percent of all eligible voters, reported the Wisconsin Elections Commission, the state’s lowest since 1996.
The county-by-county voting results for Wisconsin in the 2016 election offer insight into Trump’s victory in the state. So, too, does a look at the vote numbers in the victory by President Barack Obama over Mitt Romney in 2012. Overall, Trump received just about the same number of votes as Romney, but Clinton received nearly 240,000 fewer votes than Obama.
(Edit: It should be noted in 2018 Walker only lost by 23,000 votes. WI is getting increasingly red, following OH and IA. Currently, a generic Democrat is statistically tied with trump there.)
Here’s an academic paper on the 2016 election (one of many that has analysed the election and whose conclusions are largely ignored by media in favor of their favorite “white working class/economic anxiety” drivel they love to peddle.)
Conclusion quoted at length:
The results of our analyses demonstrated that it is too easy to consider Trump to be anti-establishment candidate, at least with regard to the voting motives of his supporters. Although we operationalized political trust and political support in two different ways, in not a single model was this a significant voting motive. Although the rhetoric about “draining the swamp” (of bureaucracy in Washington, DC) received ample media attention, our analysis suggests that it was not a major voting motive for Trump voters.
Theoretically, this is important because the literature on protest voting (and populism) states that a hostile attitude toward the political elite functions as a major voting motive for populist parties (Moffit 2016; Rooduijn 2014). Trump voters did not follow this pattern; therefore, it would be incorrect to state that the Trump election fits this general pattern of protest voting.
Furthermore, our analyses show evidence of the enduring strength of partisanship in US politics. Despite the fact that Donald Trump could be considered an ideologically extreme candidate—with personal positions that often were at odds with the official position of the Republican Party—considerations of partisanship continued to play an important role as a voting motive. Even in these conditions, most partisans followed the lead of their party. However, even among Democratic supporters, we observed a significant effect of racist resentment and antiimmigrant sentiments.
The most important finding of the analysis, however, is that racism—regardless of how it was measured—appears to have been an important motive in voting for Trump. As such, this is not a new finding because we know that, indeed, in 2008 Barack Obama suffered from a lack of support among racist voters (LewisBeck, Tien, and Nadeau 2010). The 2016 campaign, however, demonstrated that the effect of racism is not only present when voters have a choice among candidates with different ethnic backgrounds. The ideological positions and the rhetoric of the candidate clearly matter as well. In this specific election, negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants swayed independents and some Democrats to opt for candidate Trump,thereby considerably strengthening his electoral-support base.