Juan Cole: The Lies That Led To War

Politics and religion
21

MINISTERS were warned in July 2002 that Britain was committed to taking part in an American-led invasion of Iraq and they had no choice but to find a way of making it legal.

The warning, in a leaked Cabinet Office briefing paper, said Tony Blair had already agreed to back military action to get rid of Saddam Hussein at a summit at the Texas ranch of President George W Bush three months earlier.

The briefing paper, for participants at a meeting of Blair’s inner circle on July 23, 2002, said that since regime change was illegal it was “necessary to create the conditions” which would make it legal.

This was required because, even if ministers decided Britain should not take part in an invasion, the American military would be using British bases. This would automatically make Britain complicit in any illegal US action.

“US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia,” the briefing paper warned. This meant that issues of legality “would arise virtually whatever option ministers choose with regard to UK participation”.

The paper was circulated to those present at the meeting, among whom were Blair, Geoff Hoon, then defence secretary, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, and Sir Richard Dearlove, then chief of MI6. The full minutes of the meeting were published last month in The Sunday Times.

The document said the only way the allies could justify military action was to place Saddam Hussein in a position where he ignored or rejected a United Nations ultimatum ordering him to co-operate with the weapons inspectors. But it warned this would be difficult.

“It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject,” the document says. But if he accepted it and did not attack the allies, they would be “most unlikely” to obtain the legal justification they needed.

The suggestions that the allies use the UN to justify war contradicts claims by Blair and Bush, repeated during their Washington summit last week, that they turned to the UN in order to avoid having to go to war. The attack on Iraq finally began in March 2003.

In a section titled “Benefits/Risks,” the July 21 memo states, “Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks.”

Saying that “we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective,” the memo’s authors point out, “A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise.” The authors add, “As already made clear, the U.S. military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden.”

That memo and other internal British government documents were originally obtained by Michael Smith, who writes for the London Sunday Times. Excerpts were made available to The Washington Post, and the material was confirmed as authentic by British sources who sought anonymity because they are not authorized to discuss the matter.

The Bush administration’s failure to plan adequately for the postwar period has been well documented. The Pentagon, for example, ignored extensive State Department studies of how to achieve stability after an invasion, administer a postwar government and rebuild the country. And administration officials have acknowledged the mistake of dismantling the Iraqi army and canceling pensions to its veteran officers – which many say hindered security, enhanced anti-U.S. feeling and aided what would later become a violent insurgency.

Testimony by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, one of the chief architects of Iraq policy, before a House subcommittee on Feb. 28, 2003, just weeks before the invasion, illustrated the optimistic view the administration had of postwar Iraq. He said containment of Hussein the previous 12 years had cost “slightly over $30 billion,” adding, “I can’t imagine anyone here wanting to spend another $30 billion to be there for another 12 years.” As of May, the Congressional Research Service estimated that Congress has approved $208 billion for the war in Iraq since 2003.

The British, however, had begun focusing on doubts about a postwar Iraq in early 2002, according to internal memos.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR2005061100723.html

22

So who is the “Deep Throat of Downing Street?”

A story in The Independent last month pointed to a more plausible candidate for the British Deep Throat. Sir Christopher Meyer, , former British ambassador to the United States, is now writing his memoirs for publication later this year, according to the liberal London daily.

“The diplomat was present when Mr. Blair met George Bush in the President’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, in March 2002 and played a key role in the run- up to the war,” the story noted.

Meyer would have had access to top secret memoranda. Documents previously leaked to Smith show that Meyer was a critic of Bush administration policy on Iraq. And friends of the former diplomat were quoted as saying his book was “likely to make uncomfortable reading for Mr. Blair.” And, probably for President Bush too.

As U.S. media attention on the Downing Street Memo continues to grow, it is safe to say that we have probably not heard the last from the British Deep Throat.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/14/AR2005061400494_2.html

23

Memos verified by NBC. More en route.

WASHINGTON — It started during British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s re-election campaign last month, when details leaked about a top-secret memo, written in July 2002 — eight months before the Iraq war. In the memo, British officials just back from Washington reported that prewar “intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” to invade Iraq.

Just last week, President Bush and Blair vigorously denied that war was inevitable.

“No, the facts were not being fixed, in any shape or form at all,” said Blair at a White House news conference with the president on June 7.

But now, war critics have come up with seven more memos, verified by NBC News.

One, also from July 2002, says U.S. military planners had given “little thought” to postwar Iraq.

“The memos are startlingly clear that the British saw that there was inadequate planning, little planning for the aftermath,” says Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., who serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

And there’s more. To prepare Blair for a meeting at the president’s ranch in April 2002, a year before the war, four other British memos raised more questions.

After a dinner with President Bush’s then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Blair’s former national security adviser David Manning wondered, “What happens on the morning after” the war?

In yet another 2002 memo, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw asked, “What will this action achieve? Can (there) be any certainty that the replacement regime will be better? Iraq has had no history of democracy.”

Monday, Rice, now U.S. secretary of state, told Chris Matthews from MSNBC-TV’s “Hardball,” “I would never claim that the exact nature of this insurgency was understood at the time that we went to war.”

Vice President Dick Cheney also told a National Press Club luncheon Monday, “Any suggestion that we did not exhaust all alternatives before we got to that point, I think, is inaccurate.”

In fact, current and former diplomats tell NBC News they understood from the beginning the Bush policy to be that Saddam had to be removed — one way or the other. The only question was when and how.

http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8207731

24

Detailed article from the LA Times about the additional memos with context.

http://tinyurl.com/9jbvu

And a new Juan Cole analysis.

25

Live chat, right now, with Michael Smith of the Sunday Times of London at Washington Post. He’s the reporter who broke the Downing Street Memo stories.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2005/06/14/DI2005061401261.html

26

What Paul Krugman sees. While I’m not so sure getting out is a great option I absolute agree you have to defang the troublemakers and fools who got us into this mess before we can have an “adult” conversation about what to do next. Whether it’s how to win or how to minimize our losses. The current leadership has forfeited any credibility with thoughtful American people, a group starting to become a majority.

Still, some of my colleagues insist that we should let bygones be bygones. The question, they say, is what we do now. But they’re wrong: it’s crucial that those responsible for the war be held to account.

Let me explain. The United States will soon have to start reducing force levels in Iraq, or risk seeing the volunteer Army collapse. Yet the administration and its supporters have effectively prevented any adult discussion of the need to get out.

On one side, the people who sold this war, unable to face up to the fact that their fantasies of a splendid little war have led to disaster, are still peddling illusions: the insurgency is in its “last throes,” says Dick Cheney. On the other, they still have moderates and even liberals intimidated: anyone who suggests that the United States will have to settle for something that falls far short of victory is accused of being unpatriotic.

We need to deprive these people of their ability to mislead and intimidate. And the best way to do that is to make it clear that the people who led us to war on false pretenses have no credibility, and no right to lecture the rest of us about patriotism.

The good news is that the public seems ready to hear that message - readier than the media are to deliver it. Major media organizations still act as if only a small, left-wing fringe believes that we were misled into war, but that “fringe” now comprises much if not most of the population.

In a Gallup poll taken in early April - that is, before the release of the Downing Street Memo - 50 percent of those polled agreed with the proposition that the administration “deliberately misled the American public” about Iraq’s W.M.D. In a new Rasmussen poll, 49 percent said that Mr. Bush was more responsible for the war than Saddam Hussein, versus 44 percent who blamed Saddam.