Without economic assistance North Korea ceases to exist as a nation. It came very close to that point during the 1990’s famine. North Korea’s “economy” is already one in name only, and posturing to the contrary they are far from able to exist independently. They simply can’t feed their own people or run their own factories. They don’t produce enough fuel or food internally.
The Kim family may not have a Stauffenberg but you can bet he exists within the DPRK military. It’s also a safe bet that he speaks Chinese.
As opposed to the Bush administration, which views it as failure.
But since we decided to do NOTHING, we will never know.
[quoteThe Bush administration decided, correctly in my opinion, that proceeding with further negotiation was up to the North Koreans changing their positions, not in our seeing how quickly we could bribe them into another photo-op friendly conference as Kim Dae Jung did. [/quote]
Probably not the only two options, but nice false choice!
On that we agree. And as I keep saying, what the US does is kind of not all that important here. It’s really up to the North Koreans and the people footing their bills. As long as China and South Korea keep propping up their economy, the Kim regime will endure.
Throw your hands up in the air! Wave 'em round like you just don’t care!
Feel free to list any agreement with North Korea which (a) was not obtained through massive bribery or huge loss of life and (b) was not completely ignored by North Korea once they signed it.
Shouting “BUSH SHOULD HAVE DONE SOMETHING” is about as useful as shouting “BUSH SUCKS” over and over. I’m sure it makes you feel better about yourself, but isn’t really that relevant. Unless you think Bush should have spearheaded an invasion of North Korea.
Until we get more info, I have to say I doubt it was a plutonium sourced nuke. For one thing, it was a very low yield. Some commentators are saying less than 1 kT. Not that plutonium can’t be that low, but why? It is far more delicate in getting to supercritical without fizzling out. And they’ve only really had their hands on plutonium for a couple years or so.
On the other hand, Uranium is easier to work with and they have much more experience with it, like nearly a decade (I think). You don’t need very advanced tech at all to buld a gun-style Uranium nuke.
I could be totally wrong but we’ll see. Heck, we don’t even really know if it was a nuclear explosion yet.
Beats the fuck out of me, but I imagine diplomats are paid to conjure things to do in these situations. Suck up to China like no one has ever done before? Offering a leveraged buyout? Who knows? Point is, I seriously doubt all the options with some hope of working just coincidentally evaporated in 2001.
Kaplan’s article is interesting on the aid thing; it sounds likely that if we totally cut off aid NK will start with some appalling procovations; as mentioned, killing who knows how many Seoul residents.
George W. pulled Bandar aside.
“Bandar, I guess you’re the best asshole who knows about the world. Explain to me one thing.”
“Governor, what is it?”
“Why should I care about North Korea?”
Bandar said he didn’t really know. It was one of the few countries that he did not work on for King Fahd.
“I get these briefings on all parts of the world,” Bush said, “and everybody is talking to me about North Korea.”
“I’ll tell you what, Governor,” Bandar said. “One reason should make you care about North Korea.”
“All right, smart alek,” Bush said, “tell me.”
“The 38,000 American troops right on the border.” …“If nothing else counts, this counts. One shot across the border and you lose half these people immediately. You lose 15,000 Americans in a chemical or biological or even regular attack. The United State of America is at war instantly.”
“Hmmm,” Bush said. “I wish those assholes would put things just point-blank to me. I get half a book telling me about the history of North Korea.”
“Now I tell you another answer to that. You don’t want to care about North Korea anymore?” Bandar asked. The Saudis wanted America to focus on the Middle East and not get drawn into a conflict in East Asia.
“I didn’t say that,” Bush replied.
“But if you don’t, you withdrawl those troops back. Then it becomes a local conflict. Then you have the whole time to decide, ‘Should I get involved? Not involved?’ Etc.”
At that moment, Colin Powell approached.
“Colin,” Bush said, “come here. Bandar and I were shooting the bull, just two fighter pilots shooting the bull.” He didn’t mention the topic.
“Mr. Governor,” Bandar said, “General Powell is almost a fighter pilot. He can shoot the bull almost as good as us.”
shift: from what I’m reading it looks like it may have been a dud. Building a subkiloton weapon is actually a LOT harder than building a hiroshima style test weapon.
Beats the fuck out of me, but I imagine diplomats are paid to conjure things to do in these situations. Suck up to China like no one has ever done before? Offering a leveraged buyout? Who knows? Point is, I seriously doubt all the options with some hope of working just coincidentally evaporated in 2001.
Diplomats have been “conjuring” solutions to Kim’s nuclear ambitions for over a decade now. The Agreed Framework was signed October 1994, twelve damn years ago.
Too many people are confusing diplomacy with “an alternative to force.” It is not. The whole point of serious diplomacy is that in failing, it gives way to tougher action. When it first became clear to the U.S. government that North Korea had no intention of fulfilling its obligations, we faced a choice: Confront North Korea now or allow them to move toward nuclear weapons. We chose Option B. Now. unsurprisingly, we are forced to face North Korea under worse circumstances. If we back down from confronting Kim now, we will face him again under yet worse circumstances down the road. So goes history.
Kaplan’s article is interesting on the aid thing; it sounds likely that if we totally cut off aid NK will start with some appalling procovations; as mentioned, killing who knows how many Seoul residents.
We’re past the point of having to face the “appalling” – it only gets worse the longer we appease. Two years from now it will be NK threatening to sell nuclear weapons on an open market. Basically, you need to ask yourself: How badly do we want to let things deteriorate before actually taking action?
As for what action to take? Bomb the reactor at Yongbyon. Nothing says “the party is over” like having the engine of your nuclear program ripped out. Scientists may work in impregnable underground bunkers, but spent plutonium requires a reactor. It’s what we should have done in 2001, if not before. It’s what Clinton had a mind to do in the late Nineties. Too late now to erase the 8 or 9 nukes already in Kim’s hands, but the least we can do is pull the plug on their plutonium harvesting.
Regardless of your moral objections to bribery, it is one of the cornerstones of foreign policy. Further, considering North Korea dramatically accelerated their nuclear program during Bush’s administration, appeasement was clearly a more effective containment policy than sanctimonious inaction.
From what I’ve read, the response to this on the other side will probably be Kim killing lots of South Korean civilians and escalating the situation. What’s your preprogrammed response? Can you outline me a scenario here where this doesn’t turn into full-blown war? As a followup, in that scenario how many SK civilians can be expected to die? Why do you expect South Korea to support this plan?
From the linked plan:
Tailoring the strikes in such a way as to maximize returns but to limit the likelihood of a North Korean retaliation would be extremely difficult. The North Korean leadership is already acutely paranoid and sensitive to US military actions and might be predisposed to respond any air strikes by initiating a full-scale war.
This isn’t like mid-1980s Iraq where they’re just going to take it.
The biggest problem with military options is the difficulty of preventing North Korean military retaliation. Defenses could not protect the South Korean population from North Korean artillery and missile strikes, while U.S. efforts to attack these weapons would escalate the conflict without removing North Korea’s retaliatory capability. The United States would be forced to rely upon deterrence–possibly reinforced with explicit nuclear threats–to prevent or limit North Korean counter-attacks. North Korea would have the initiative and the ability to calibrate its response to maximize U.S. political and military problems. This might include threats or the actual use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The most likely result would be North Korean conventional counter-attacks combined with threats to escalate toward a full-scale ground war and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. If deterrence failed to prevent North Korean counter-attacks, the United States would be faced with a very unappealing military situation, especially at a time when many U.S. forces are deployed in the Persian Gulf.
The political consequences might be even more significant. South Korea and Japan strongly oppose military attacks against North Korean nuclear facilities, largely due to their vulnerability to North Korean retaliatory strikes. Their alliances with the United States are predicated on the belief that the presence of U.S. forces on their territory enhances their security. U.S. military actions that resulted in North Korean counter-attacks against their territory could destroy support for an alliance with the United States and end U.S. access to bases in South Korea and Japan. Military attacks might also fundamentally change the nature of U.S. relations with China and Russia, who strongly oppose resolving the nuclear crisis through military means. There is even some possibility of direct military conflict with China (which still has a security treaty with North Korea). More broadly, a U.S. pre-emptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities would arguably violate international law and would convey the message that the United States can use nuclear threats to attack sovereign states with impunity. This would reinforce concerns many countries have about a growing trend towards unilateralism in American foreign policy. The result might only undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but also damage the foundations of the current international order.
Further, considering North Korea dramatically accelerated their nuclear program during Bush’s administration, appeasement was clearly a more effective containment policy than sanctimonious inaction.
Madness. North Korea’s development program continued apace from 1994 onward. Clinton’s administration was well aware of this but never took action. Pinning this crisis on Bush is ridiculous. (I’ll add my usual note: I’ve never voted for a Republican in my life.)
Our current predicament is the result of 15 years of irresponsible (read: toothless) U.S. foreign policy. This crisis was inevitable as soon as the U.S. (and the UN, more generally) made the decision to stand aside while Kim violated his treaty obligations and crept ever-closer to a nuclear capability.
From what I’ve read, the response to this on the other side will probably be Kim killing lots of South Korean civilians and escalating the situation. What’s your preprogrammed response? Can you outline me a scenario here where this doesn’t turn into full-blown war? As a followup, in that scenario how many SK civilians can be expected to die?
This isn’t like mid-1980s Iraq where they’re just going to take it.
My strong feeling is that Kim would not initiate his own immolation. He’s not insane, just insanely protective of his status as dictator. He will act to preserve himself. (And if he does choose to initiate his own immolation, at least the war will come before he’s had a chance to open up a nuclear bazaar for all cash-holding comers.)
It’s ugly, Jason. No way around that. But the future is uglier without confronting these threats. And to your specific question about South Korea, I’d answer it with some questions of my own for South Koreans, namely: Where has the “Sunshine” policy gotten you? Why did you steadfastly oppose every U.S. diplomatic initiative aimed at screwing down on Kim before he could go nuclear? What did your appeasement of Kim buy you, other than the nuclear Sword of Damocles that now hangs over you? etc
It seems to me that the only possible military solution is a nuclear first strike on their nuclear facilities and artillery positions. Anything short of that results in the destruction of Seoul and the launching of a regional war, which would in the long run be more desctructive than a nuclear first strike. A targetted strike that leaves them unable to hit Seoul will see no response, since no one is going to stand up for NK.
Although the US has always held that nuclear force is an appropriate response to conventional provocation, in this case I don’t think it is wise. The threat from the North Korean government does not rise to the level that justifies a large-scale application of nuclear destruction. So I think we are not in a position to use or even threaten force.
With confrontation being overly risky, we’re stuck with containment and appeasement. My suggestion is a nuke buy-back program.
More broadly, a U.S. pre-emptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities would arguably violate international law and would convey the message that the United States can use nuclear threats to attack sovereign states with impunity.
Firstly, our strike would be in response to a blatant violation of international law. Secondly, the United States should convey the message that we will attack “sovereign states” that pose an intolerable nuclear threat. You’d rather wage a dozen Cold Wars against a dozen Third-World rogue regimes with nukes? Regimes that sleep with globe-spanning terrorist proxies? Regimes that would (in practice) have a free pass for blackmail, since we couldn’t hope to hit them without provoking a nuclear retaliation? Insanity.
The result might only undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but also damage the foundations of the current international order.
What do you call a North Korean nuclear detonation?
If the precious “current international order” is code for “unchecked nuclear proliferation among rogue states,” then my vote is for damaging its foundations.
Even the site you link to explains how impractical, nay, boneheaded that idea is–and it doesn’t even discuss South Korea’s or China’s possible objections.
Even the site you link to explains how impractical, nay, boneheaded that idea is–and it doesn’t even discuss South Korea’s or China’s possible objections.
It concedes that a strike on the reactor would not be the end of North Korea’s nuclear program. That goes without saying. It would, however, be a serious blow to that program, and more importantly, it would be a serious action taken, one that changes the current calculus of “Kim acts as belligerently as he can and gets everything he wants for a reward.”
Yeah, and while everyone’s saying they’ve broken the law I’m trying to figure out exactly what law they’ve broken. They withdrew from the NPT, so that’s not binding them - what is?
Yeah, and while everyone’s saying they’ve broken the law I’m trying to figure out exactly what law they’ve broken. They withdrew from the NPT, so that’s not binding them - what is?
Classic material. Well, the problem’s all settled then, isn’t it?
Daniel you need to chill out - I’m not asking to be confrontational, I’m asking because you’ve asserted something and I honestly don’t know if it’s true.
Trust me, you’ll know when it’s time to get defensive you retarded fuckwit. :D
In other words, you buy all the neocon bullshit. Right, a cold war against a bunch of countries that have maybe 10% of our economy combined.
Yeah, it’d change the calculus alright - thousands of dead Korean civilians in retaliation. Then we retaliate, then they do, the US/South Korea alliance splinters or the entire region gets drawn into an all-out conflict, then…what? Basically an attack on North Korea, with the escalation there being what it is, results in the practical equivalent of declaring full scale war.
What, you think he’s just going to back down because you shot up a facility? You’re engaging in some serious magical thinking here.
