20845

Huh? That’s not the status now - that MWI article if from March - 8 months ago! A LOT has happened since then, and not a lot of that is overly demonstative as improvements in Russian logistics.

Almost none of the doctrine discussed in that article has been clearly demonstrated with any consistency by Russia since March.

20846

The reverse has been true. Russian weaknesses in logistics have only amplified over time, and vulnerabilities have been exploited in particular as Ukrainian weapons dramatically improved in both reach and accuracy.

Most of the tubers have simply no idea. Napoleon said - “the amateurs discuss tactics; the professionals discuss logistics”. As Russia pulls back to defensive positions, its logistics issues fighting on land held since 2014 would be significantly diminished but I believe even then supplying troops at current levels would be a terrific strain and they will need external support in some fashion.

20847

This is a perfect example of your argumentation. Thus is NOT “what the status is now” as you claim. For supporting evidence you post a seven month old article on logistics, which talks of further Russian drives to Kyiv, Odessa, etc, all of which is totally irrelevant now. LOL, Russian forces are nowhere near Kyiv and they have withdrawn from Kherson and are never going to reach Odessa. And we know a lot more about Russian logistics now than seven months ago - when the war was barely a month old! In addition, the article is talking about the Russian forces as of that date - it says nothing about Russia’s ability to support an additional million men in Ukraine in the near future.

Those of us who have made claims have not merely “asserted” them. I myself have given a number of reasons supported by Western analysts and yet you have yet to address a single point/argument I have made, as I have pointed out a number of times. You continue to ignore every point I make about Russian logistics. This is why it is hard to take seriously what you say.

20848

The article is from March… since then Russia has LOST territory.

20849

I wasn’t aware of the dating issue, I’m not used to American dating, thought the article was from October…my bad there.

I don’t think the author of that article had any idea that the Russian soldiers in Belarus had sold all the fuel before the offensive…

I don’t think poor logistics is an issue in most places, except Kherson, which was pretty bad.
If I was to contribute something, I’d say Ukrainian precision artillery, high morale, and higher troop count have helped a lot of places.

I think counting on Russian logistics to have a breakdown is still wishful thinking.

20850

Logistics breakdowns are why Russia’s advances were halted and why they just retreated from Kherson a few weeks ago. The war started with a massive logistics breakdown in Kyiv and is likely why Russia didn’t win the war then and there. I don’t think that’s wishful thinking, that’s observing the war.

That said, with supply lines shortening that might change going forward. It’s a question of degree, though, and I still don’t know how Russia might pull off another major offensive without getting themselves in the same pickle. That’s not to say that’s it’s impossible for them to improve here and fix issues, but it’s going to take a lot of work and we’ll likely see indications of it happening. That sort of analysis would be informative and welcome!

20851

I am prepared to show even older YouTube videos that support my claim that Russia has deep and plush terrycloth reserves.

20852

I think the Russians had some serious issues working against them in Kherson - a massive river at their back that couldn’t be forged except by pontoon bridges and an opponent who could put rounds on those bridges using intel provided by their superpower backer. So in that sense, the situation that Russia found itself in while trying to defend Kherson is unique in the war, yes.

However, while the terrain was somewhat unique in Kherson due to the Dnieper, there are river-like gaps in the line of communication system throughout occupied Ukraine. Put simply, the Russian army simply can’t go very far beyond where track is laid for trains. This, more than anything, is what is challenging the Russians from advancing at ‘weak points’ in the Ukrainian lines.

You’ve asserted multiple times that Ukraine can’t be strong everywhere and that the Russians just need to mass their forces at one of those locations and push. But, in a lot of places, Ukraine simply doesn’t need to put a particularly strong defending force, because there isn’t the road/rail grid in place to support the advance. The map isn’t a video game where you’re just trying to move units along a front and try to ‘break through.’

This war has really shown the weaknesses in the centralized ‘push’ style logistics that the Soviet and now, Russian, militaries relied on. It’s why control of key hubs in the LoC system has been so crucial - and why the Ukrainians are clinging to Bakhmut so tenaciously.

This point fascinates me and I can’t wait for some post-war analysis of what actually happened there. But my interpretation of it isn’t that the logistics system there ‘failed’ per-se, but rather that the required advances didn’t materialize, and that, combined with the push-style logistics of the system, led to that huge column not moving. It’s not that the trucks broke down or ran out of fuel (although admittedly plenty of that happened on local scales), it’s that without the required advances, those trucks weren’t able to reach their required drop points, unload, and make the return trip. Then the top-heavy command structure of the Russian military kicked in and amplified those challenges by not empowering lower rank officers from making local decisions that could have changed the outcome.

Essentially, the planning failed and the logistics system wasn’t able to adapt to conditions hadn’t been planned explicitly planned for.

I think that the fact that the Russians were largely able to retreat from such a colossal failure at all (and again in Kherson) are actually signs that the Russian military is still a dangerous beast that isn’t quite as defeated as some might wish. From that perspective, I understand Janster’s general fears. But the Russians need to overcome some serious inertia issues both on the battlefield and in how their entire freaking country works in order to turn things around.

20853

I’ve been saying for a while now. There have been multiple instances where Ukraine could have encircled BTGs, and the Russians have managed to slip the net with most of their troops each time.

Of course, you don’t win a war by being skilled at retreating.

20854

Well, George Washington mostly did, but I wouldn’t expect a repeat of how that played out here.

20855

I’m certainly not predicting more total breakdowns of supply like the Kyiv convoy. But we know from intelligence(seriously, bits and pieces in daily updates all the time on this stuff) that Russian logistics are strained at best. That has led to troops without necessary supplies having to scrounge for food and other necessities. It’s also led to the Russians having to be more careful about artillery usage than they were at the beginning of the war. Clearly plenty of shells are getting to the frontlines but you don’t hear about the sustained shelling in places anywhere near as much. All of this leads to lower morale and lower combat effectiveness. There is a reason Russia hasn’t managed to mount a real offensive in months, and I’d wager a big part of that is supply.

So if they are already in that position I’m incredibly skeptical adding more troops to the front is going to help anything.

I should dig up whatever daily update recently had Russian conscripts complaining about only getting fed once per day even though more food was actually available. If they keep getting treated that poorly they’ll never be close to effective.

20856

One of the interesting facets of the latest period of the war is that Russian troops are most at risk when they are concentrated - massing of troops, equipment, and supplies nodes are easier for Ukrainian long distance artillery to destroy.

Thus the massive build up in Izium became a problem because they were so exposed - they could disperse their forces, but not the logistic dumps.

So far the Russians have not been able to solve this problem outside of their own territory (and the friendly areas conquered in 2014 - and even their they are constantly attacked)

20857

Let’s keep in mind, too, that it’s not really winter yet. Mariopol is still consistently above freezing, the first big cold snap will tell a lot.

20858

On the other hand if retreating means fleeing and leaving all the heavy weapons and armor behind, which can’t be easily replaced, then that BTG would be severely degraded. Men with rifles, essentially.

20859

The post above about the lack of training for winter for the conscripts was really good. Even having all the right gear doesn’t mean shit if you don’t use it right. I get most Russians have some understand of dealing with cold, but there is a big difference between knowing how to spend a few hours outside in the cold and spending days and weeks in it.

20860

I’ll plainly state I have severe concerns over Ukraine’s ability to fully eject Russian forces from their territory. This comes less from a numbers/hardware/socks issue and more from my notion that wars end when both sides agree to end them and I’ve never seen Russia choose to end anything except Afghanistan, and that took close to 10 years.

I spent a decent amount of time in Russia waaaay back when (came to visit Leningrad, but I eventually left Saint Petersburg), and the pride people felt in holding out to eventually overcome was palpable. Likewise, the shame in their loss in Afghanistan could be felt; if I ever asked about that war, I made sure to bring up the siege in WWII and Russia tanking for the Allies to help win back then in the same sentence. Of course, the people in charge and with boots on the ground are all different these days; time moves on even when our memories refuse to. But that same dynamic is why I worry, as it speaks to a sheer societal stubbornness streak in Russia when it comes to flexing their military might.

I honestly wonder how leadership could survive a full withdrawal, which makes me think Putin will never order one despite the costs in treasure and manpower. On the flipside, Ukraine cannot surrender its territory; doing so would not only leave them permanently economically crippled and politically compromised, but it would also signal to bad actors worldwide the age of military expansionism has not yet passed (not Ukraine’s immediate concern, but a really good bit of our own self-interest in supporting their plight with aid).

I can see the war going several different ways, but my inexact “gut feeling” tells me we’ll still see some movement throughout the winter, spring’s muddy season will slow down again, and then some more pushes in the summer and by that point the losses will be so high for both sides that I wonder if Ukraine might sue for peace and get some slightly favorable terms where they get a decent chunk of land back but Russia keeps a foothold. That would be a bitter pill to swallow, but I’m just trying to internally resolve the discord between what I’ve known of Russia’s willingness to throw bodies at a “problem” vs. Ukraine’s “@#$% you, Russian warship” defiance and trying to find an end state.

On the flip side, perhaps Putin’s regime does eventually topple. It’s hard to say how popular a conflict is in any nation, especially in one that’s single-party rule. That said, not many people like dying, either personally or their loved ones. Neither do they particularly enjoy losing wealth and lowered standards of living. This makes me think there’s a real cost being paid in Russia as we speak, the question being how severe and if it will reach a tipping point before the conflict finds another way to end.

20861

I don’t remember if this has been mentioned above but it has been verified that the Russians are now taking the warheads off of short range nuclear missiles and launching the missiles at Ukraine. You don’t do this if you have plenty of missiles in your inventory.

20862

May be, but an entire or two generation has died off since then, and new generations have come along. Somewhere between 200,000 and 700,000 young men fled Russia when mobilization was announced. That tells me something may have changed in the intervening years. And polls indicate that support for the war has dropped dramatically. I think we will know a lot more after the winter, early spring.

20863

I think it’s very obvious that this war doesn’t end while Putin rules in Russia (absent a Ukrainian collapse). With the amount of prestige invested in this (not least due to the annexations), I really can’t see a way he retreats from this without losing power.

A new regime might now want to do that either, but at least have the out of being able to blame Putin for the mistakes.

20864

If I had to choose between Ukranian national pride and Russian stubbornness, Imma pick Ukraine.