That’s… an interesting take, to mince words. Wildly uninformed to the extreme.
Spain’s experience with terrorism is long and complex (and I would not really characterize it as backing down, precisely).
Spain joining the Iraq war was deeply unpopular (the 2003 anti war demonstrations were the biggest since Franco’s death, with an estimated 6+ million protesters in a country of 40 million people. Many cities had protesters numbering over 50% their population). A government change was going to change our involvement. No bombings necessary. But the government was polling well (economy was good).
Then the bombings happened a week or so before elections, and the pro-war, anti-local terrorism government lied for days about the identity of the most likely suspects, to try to squeeze an electoral gain (not to minimize an impact). They were going to win the elections, but the lying (not the bombings per se, that would have had an effect, but likely much smaller) changed the result dramatically.
These bombings are likely going to dramatically hurt perception of Russia over here (and it wasn’t good to start with).
KevinC
20966
Do Spanish authorities think the bombs are Russian in origin? I had assumed it would be domestic nutter of the at-the-end-of-the-horseshoe variety.
It’s just the fact that it was done to support Russia. Who actually sent the bombs (unless something insane like a demonstrably false flag) matters little.
Grifman
20969
How about some Christmas cheer:
No doubt. My musing was mostly about the broader questions around the role of artillery, for example. Neither side in this war is able to use air power the way, say, American doctrine would wants to use it. In that sort of environment (if such an environment was possible of course) the ground situation might well be transformed.
Grifman
20971
Kyiv last Christmas, in happier times:
Not being at all a Spaniard or even a follower of Spanish politics, this is what I remember from the time. They wanted to pin it on the traditional enemy, the ETA, rather than the radical Islamic terrorism, or vice versa, to make the entry into the Iraq war seem less of a boondoggle. Or something, the details are fuzzy now that I try to remember it.
Taking a look at the RUSI report this evening, and the first thing that jumps out is the incredible optimism of Russian planning
This emphasis on speed led to units being ordered to advance in administrative column by road and to attempt to bypass any initial resistance.
“Administrative column” meaning: please ambush us, we promise to be in a tactically helpless formation when you do.
The assumption was that by D+10, Russian units would transition to stabilisation operations. The synchronisation matrix of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District), for example, captured near Kyiv in March 2022, stated that by D+10 the force would ‘proceed to the blocking and destruction of individual scattered units of the Armed Forces and the remnants of nationalist resistance units’.
So the “three day special operation” mocking is slightly hyperbolic, but yes indeed, the Russian detailed military planning did assume that the war would be over in 10 days.
These plans were drawn up by a very small group of officials and the intent was directed by Putin. Many officials executing elements of the preparation were unaware of the wider intent. Russian military personnel – even up to deputy heads of branches within the Russian General Staff – were unaware of the intention to invade and occupy Ukraine until days before the invasion, and tactical military units did not receive orders until hours before they entered Ukraine.
No independent red teaming appears to have taken place. Instead, the plan itself – while theoretically plausible – compounded optimism bias in each of its stages and, most tellingly, offered no reversionary courses of action, indicated no decision points to determine whether conventional forces should adjust their posture nor envisaged any outcome other than its own success.
Interesting that until the last minute, Ukraine’s own assessment of Russian intentions was badly off.
Until days before the full-scale Russian invasion, the intelligence community of Ukraine broadly assessed that the most dangerous enemy course of action was a high-intensity offensive against Donbas in late February 2022, with the Russians using the destruction of the Ukrainian forces in the JFO area as a means of destabilising the Ukrainian state. The most likely enemy course of action was assessed to be a prolonged period of political destabilisation to create favourable conditions for a military offensive in the early summer, with the main effort being against Donbas.
Several factors contributed to the assessment that Donbas would be the main effort, despite extensive warnings from Ukraine’s international partners that Kyiv would be the enemy’s main effort. First, an assessment of Russian forces north of Kyiv concluded that they lacked sufficient troops to effectively isolate and seize the city. The offensive was therefore viewed as a diversionary deployment, aimed at drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces away from Donbas.
Second, interception of communications and observation of the Russian units on the Gomel axis confirmed that the personnel did not believe they were going to war and were not prepared for major combat operations.
In this sense, it is worth emphasising that the Russian deception plan was largely successful through the information security measures taken, but that the impact on the combat effectiveness of Russian troops through a failure to brief them with sufficient time to prepare came at considerable cost.
Nevertheless, since Donbas was anticipated to be the main axis, over 10 combat brigades, constituting around half of the manoeuvre forces of the UAF, were kept in the JFO area.
Nor were there any major units committed to defend the approach from Crimea, even though this was specified in the national defence plan. The reasons for this are currently subject to an investigation. TDF were nascent, only had light weapons and were not yet fully integrated into the military command. Ukraine’s defence plans therefore aimed at a high-intensity defence in the direction of Donbas lasting six weeks, giving time for full-scale mobilisation of the reserves.
The wording of the report is much nicer to the Ukrainians then it is to the Russians, but this does look like them suffering from the same problem of planning for the best case only. Assuming that a Russian offensive would be limited to the Donbass - operationally equivalent to attacking Ukraine from the front while not threatening its flanks - would be the easiest threat for Ukraine to defend and allow the rest of the country to mobilise in relative safety. How convenient of Russia!
The note about “subject to investigation” is kind of interesting / ominous too.
As it became apparent that the Gomel axis [the thrust from Belarus towards Kyiv] was the enemy’s main effort and that another group of forces would strike through Chernihiv, a redeployment of Ukrainian forces was ordered approximately seven hours prior to the invasion. This took considerable time. The result was that many Ukrainian units were not at their assigned defensive positions when the invasion began and, especially on the northern axes, were not in prepared positions.
One can imagine the confusion and difficulty that kind of last-minute redeployment would have led to.
It’s clear that Russia genuinely believed - enough to make plans based on it - that many Ukrainians could be persuaded to accept Russian occupation.
An important element of the Russian plan to disorganise Ukraine’s military C2 system was also to neutralise the top military leadership of the UAF. Thus, in the first days of the invasion, a large number of Ukrainian generals received personal messages from Russian military leaders urging them to surrender and assuring them that Russia did not intend to do any harm to Ukraine. Messages of similar content, but sent from anonymous numbers, were received by almost all colonels and other senior officers of the UAF. The strategic importance of this campaign is evidenced by the fact that on the second day of the invasion, Putin publicly appealed to the Ukrainian military to not resist the Russian invasion. This failed campaign also highlights the poor assessment of the psychology of the Ukrainian military by the Russian special services.
Ukraine was good at deception from very early on…
The poor Russian battle damage assessment process made the Russian military highly vulnerable to deception, which has been consistent throughout the conflict. Early strikes on Ukrainian airfields, for example, destroyed many hangars. By photographing this damage and printing the resulting pattern on to sheets, it became possible to clear the rubble and erect covers for aircraft to return to the site, sheltering in positions that the Russians would confirm as destroyed. This led – somewhat amusingly – to the Russians debating whether Ukrainian fighter aircraft were operating from subterranean shelters at several sites. Repeated strikes on dummy air-defence positions also saw a considerable wastage of ammunition, while Ukrainian troops could confirm that sites were destroyed over the radio even when they were still functioning, causing Russian aircraft to ignore air-defence systems in their mission planning. The already-publicly reported use of dummy HIMARS (high mobility artillery rocket system) later in the war to lure Russian fires is indicative of the systematic use of deception to ensure survivability by the UAF, and it has proven widely effective.
…and this vulnerability to deception led to serious early losses.
The presumption of success caused the Russian military to take several unjustifiable risks in the disposition of its forces during the first 72 hours of the conflict. Aircraft did not fly with EW pods during the opening phase as they were not deemed necessary following the presumed success of the strike campaign. Similarly, Russian manoeuvre forces were not properly supported by air-defence units and Russian air-defence units were told to presume that aircraft were friendly. This enabled a significant number of ground-attack sorties by the Ukrainian Air Force, including using UAVs such as TB2, against Russian formations, even when they had attached air-defence units.
ddtibbs
20979
They tried to do an Operation Market Garden, and ended up with…an Operation Market Garden.
I would assume the same thing for anyone who goes around smearing doorknobs with neuro-toxins to assassinate people in foreign countries, instead of just shooting them like a normal person, and yet…
The Russians are so unprofessional, there’s really no way to tell.
Janster
20981
There is a narrative on youtube and social media that this war is Ukraine’s own fault, I don’t know the extent, but its clear its not just a few.
There is also a solid portion that thinks…quite erroneously that all the money and guns to Ukraine is reducing our own defense, just in case Russia should find magic and open more fronts…
As for underestimating Russia, I think so, they are competent, and their doctrines are not shit, however since the troops didn’t think there was going to be an invasion, they did what they always do, sold the fuel and spare parts…
Que drama…
As for reinforcements, I’m still right, they are recruiting way more than 300k, as it isn’t enough to win, so they will need more, I don’t care what people bitch about recruitment woes, they will overcome…
Also, logistics, fuck me, they have modern roads, they didn’t in 1944, and they supplied 11 million at most then.
Sabotai
20982
A bit surprised was I when opening the latest Amazon delivery. It contained 25 Powerbanks, all equipped with a flashlight. I wanted to run back to the delivery guy who was about to drive away in order to take back this obvious false delivery, when I noticed the name on the label; one of our Ukrainian refugees.
With their humble salaries they were cleaning out Amazon Powerbank stock and sending it back to their friends and family back home who have no light or heating, nor running water.
Before they refused our (fundraising) help, but now we pressed the issue and they relented.
So this week, we (my wife and me) have started a campaign to buy generators for NoviBorovych, a village of 900 souls. We are helped by a Ukrainian couple living in our neighbourhood who have the network and experience in sending goods back to the Ukraine.
Some people in this thread have expressed interest in helping out, so I will post this link here. I will also post it in the Ukrainian help thread!
Thanks for indulging me.
You can’t just jump from “need” to “will do”, let alone “are doing”, as you’ve been told a million times. Russia needed to do a lot of things it hasn’t done. You can say “I think they will try to recruit more”. But just jumping over that step to present it as a fait accompli is absurd (especially when you then go on to berate other people’s naivete for not believing the same thing).
Janster
20984
Well done Sabotai, I will donate to the campaign soon :)
As for our million-man argument, I think people are naive, that or have eaten a bit much western wishful thinking about stuff.
Russian Warmachine might be rusty, but its still highly dangerous, I think its sad how many Russian are willing to die for Putins lunacy. From what I see on the front, heroism is prevalent on both sides, almost heartbreakingly so.
Putin can’t back down, he can’t lose, because if he does, not just will his life be in danger, but his family, entire fucking bloodline…
The stakes are real high on their side of the fence.
