22232

Shoot, I’ll see if I can find some breakdowns of why they say Bakhmut isn’t important, but they are out there. The gist of it is that it used to be important to Russia as long as they held Lyman. If you look at Google maps, you can see that there is a highway that connects them and I believe it was an important one for Russia to control while they were trying to hold on to Lyman. After they retreated, capturing Bakhmut doesn’t give them anything anymore. It doesn’t open up any new avenues of attack or anything along those lines, hence it’s strategically unimportant.

At least, that’s my recollection. It might very well be inaccurate or incomplete, but that’s what I recall.

EDIT: Here’s one from Nov 30 when it was looking like Russia might take the city.

22233

I think Russia should send as many of its forces as possible, at the same time, into 200km of salt mines.

Russia’s strategy is to force battles of attrition at this point. They don’t care where they are, but they want to force Ukraine on the defensive at point X, then force them to endure massive artillery and combat losses defending it against a Russian offensive. As long as Russia is trading 1:1, they’re winning, because Putin will not stop drafting and sending bodies to die from his side.

This is actually hard for Ukraine to stop. If Ukraine pulls back, Russia moves forward and does it at the next defensive line. If Ukraine counter-attacks, they’re unlikely to capture or destroy more Russian forces than it costs them in the offensive. Ukraine lacks the force-multiplying advantages of modern overlapping combat systems.

The only danger to Russia is basically internal dissent and economic collapse. Basically the best possibility for Ukraine barring some new development is to endure a year of massive, WW1 style attrition that expends most of Russia’s modern material, then has some ability to counter attack and shatter a demoralized line. But Ukraine really needs some big victories, like surrounding and capturing 40k troops in some salient.

22234

I figure that the dude in charge sees the Salt and Gypsum mines simply as his way of making money when this is all done, assuming the line stabilizes and he gets to keep them. Like, he’s not conquering this ground for the war effort. He’s doing it specifically for himself, which given what we know about the Russians in general, makes complete sense. The corruption runs so deep that it’s always about “I’ve got mine.” when it’s all said and done.

22235

Heh.

22236

This is still a Wagner offensive, right? That guy has been pretty open about the fact that he’s really doing all of this for personal gain.

I guess the question is, do we have any real data on the loss ratio?

And Russia is going to be in real trouble if they can’t pivot to tactics that aren’t so incredibly artillery intensive. Unless they can find a way to sustain that consumption of ammunition.

From a pretty cold-hearted perspective, actual manpower shortages are a future problem. The immediate problem for both sides are what kind of manpower you can keep supplied on each front. Ukraine seems to understand this, hitting Russian supply/logistics have been a big part of their HIMARS targeting. Russia doesn’t seem to care about this as much, as they still focus on civilian targets for their long-range strikes. I strongly doubt that long-term solid strategic planning/execution is the priority for any of the decisionmakers on the Russian side. It’s all individual motivations/advancement/trying to avoid high windows and probably a lot of trying to make sure somebody else can take the fall.

22237

ISWYDT.

22238

I think the good news is that whatever the loss ratio, it’s beyond dispute that the Ukrainians have the tactical advantage. The Russians clearly aren’t getting as much out of their forces.

How that might change if they opt for total war is my concern.

I think we can all agree that Prigozhin is a very strange and corrupt man, but I don’t find that very credible. First of all, salt and gypsum. Really?

Wagner is supposedly being paid with mines in Africa (an old staple of the mercenary business) so it’s not that they’re opposed to mines, but there are far better strategic reasons to own a Ukrainian Tora Bora than making table salt and fertilizer.

There’s artillery and rockets raining from the sky, y’know? :)

Thanks man!

Now I’m curious what would get them a cookie from analysts. What should they be doing instead?

22239

There needs to be a Westwood RTS 90’s Red Alert Defenestration Tank. Imagine the unit responses.

“Opening windows”
“Prepare… for a fall”
“How about a push?”
“Try flapping your arms!”

22240

part cover story, part speculation

22241

I guess if he was a little shorter, and he had a scar, he could sort of look like Dr. Evil, but it’s my general policy to be very skeptical when real world people are made out to be cartoon villains.

“I will have all of this salt for my catering business, muahaha”

It doesn’t really make sense. His table salt is right on the front line. Doesn’t seem like a super great business proposition.

How useful those mineshafts would be in any strategic sense, I also don’t know, but as we know, mineshaft gaps are a thing, and I’m pretty sure a man like Prigozhin has a lot of bodies he needs to dump somewhere.

22242

Yeah it makes no sense. Everyone just wants to boil things down to some simple supposedly rational reason. I had a friend who told me that the whole war was kicked off because Russia wanted to secure water supplies for Crimea.

The truth is the objectives and reasons for taking them have become symbolic and tactical. Bakhmut is a worthwhile objective for Russia because at this point backing off would be seen as an embarrassing failure. Tactically then, Soledar is important because frontally assaulting Bakhmut has been a disaster and well maybe they can slowly encircle it. That’s it, that’s really the whole significance of the thing.

22243

That’s my (clueless armchair) read on the situation. I recall reading that military leaders convinced Putin to allow a withdrawal from Kherson in order to press offensives elsewhere, which they have failed to do. I’m sure it would be quite the political victory for Prigozhin if he’s able to show a successful offensive when the Russian army hasn’t, as he has been trying to weaken his rivals in the Ministry of Defense.

22244

I think that’s a good read, very symbolic of the whole war.

22245

Well, the analysts might be wrong. Wandering into the jargon a bit, analysts might say that a good concept of operations has to identify the enemy “center of gravity” (e.g. the thing or things that would directly impact the opponent’s ability to continue to fight) and directly threaten it, thus forcing the enemy to respond. Forcing the enemy to respond is how you regain the initiative; instead of building reserves to launch their next offensive at their chosen time and place, now they are forced to redirect those reserves to where your forces are strongest and take on a passive defensive role. And if the threat you present is urgent enough, often the need to respond can force the opponent to take risks and leave themselves off balance.

So analysts are looking at Bahkmut and seeing that it has no particular economic or political importance to Ukraine, and while it did have some possible operational value back in June last year (where it theoretically looked like a possible southern pincer in an encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the Donbas) that has now disappeared. In other words, it looks like the opposite of a “center of gravity”. It seems to be a politically chosen objective whose capture will have no strategic value.

And yet, Ukraine has responded. Bahkmut has been reinforced. Ukraine is committing at least some of its limited army reserves, and its valuable artillery, in order to keep the fight going.

The best case scenario is that Ukraine sees this as a valuable economy of force exercise in which, say, one reinforcing Ukrainian brigade will suck three new Russian brigades into an attritional battle where the ratio of losses heavily favour Ukraine. And that Ukraine has enough resources to accumulate reserves for their next offensive as well as doing this. The Ukrainian high command has done so much right, and has always been willing to retreat before a situation became untenable, that we have good reasons to believe this scenario. But we don’t have nearly enough information to know that this scenario is true.

The worst case scenario is that both sides have created a kind of mini-Verdun, where political considerations are outweighing the military, and Ukraine might have committed so many resources to defeating the Russian attack that they don’t have anything left for an offensive elsewhere. And maybe the losses are heavy enough on both sides that the Russian attrition strategy will bear long-term fruit. I don’t really believe in this scenario yet, but we definitely don’t have enough info to know for sure that it’s untrue.

22246

Even with the significantly superior Ukrainian OpSec, I think that if they were trading 1:1 in Bakhmut, we would be hearing/reading about it. I’ve no doubt that Ukraine is taking a lot of losses in that area, but I’m pretty sure it’s not 1:1. An even casaulty ratio doesn’t make sense, if you consider that one side has proper equipment, an excellent supply situation, excellent defense in depth, while their opponents have none of that.

22247

22248

I don’t think they are trading 1:1 right now, that would at least go against how this stuff have worked out in the past, with the exception of US workings in Iraq etc.

However, artillery is a force multiplier in itself, and if you are being constantly shelled without the ability to return to sender, you will take casualties without impacting the attacker, this has and is continuing to happen.

Germans lost tons of soldiers towards end of the war against just this…and Russia is eager to copy it, but if they expend a shit-ton of shells now, they could hopefully be so low later on, they will have nothing to support the 500k they are conscripting now.

22249

More aid to Ukraine incoming, 12 SP artillery from Sweden, probably Strkyer’s from the US, artillery shells from Pakistan, 90 refurbished T-72’s from the Czechs:

22250

And Canada purchased a NASAMS to donate to Ukraine!

22251

I haven’t watched the whole discussion but it’s glorious. “Neutral” (as in pro-facts and the facts say that the decadent West will lose to glorious Russia) Gonzalo Lira debates mostly with LazerPig, who is a pig that shoots lasers from his eyes.