This CNN article says it pretty well–watching realistic world politics play out in real-time via social media exposes the harshness and ruthless utilitarianism of Realpolitik. Emotions thus start to engage in ways they never did during the Cold War era.
Good question. Sadly, most authoritarian regimes don’t provide much in the way of honest feedback on their decision process, so we kind of have to guess. I don’t pretend to have the answers, only lots of questions :).
Oh, and that’s some serious mud in that clip above on the capture vehicle. Looks like my own dirt road outside my house. Minus the Russian military vehicles, though. We have Yankee Bubba though with his 4x4 and probably almost as much firepower.
I thought this was a really good interview about Russian strategy and counterinsurgency. The interviewee is an Australian author and consultant to both Bush and Obama administrations (maybe Trump, too?). He seems to be generally in the neocon orbit, but was a critic of the Iraq invasion before it happened (publicly called it “fucking stupid,” in fact) and a critic of drone strike policy.
He brings up some interesting stuff, like the fact that many of Russia’s nukes are tiny, smaller than Hiroshima, and meant to be battlefield weapons. And also that that means Russia doesn’t necessarily think of using nukes as a strategic escalation to WWIII the way we do. What happens if they use a nuke that is only (to inappropriately quote Monty Python) “wah-fer thin”? Maybe they hit only military targets? Do we respond with Cold War-style retaliation?
That’s how they’re defending? Seems like quite the ripe target for any ground forces.
Does Russia have a need to use a tactical nuke at this point? I would suspect their problem isn’t delivering large, conventional explosives (e.g., via artillery or air strikes) on target or facing super-hardened targets—it’s finding appropriate targets and, perhaps, not causing undue collateral damage. If that is the case, a tactical nuke doesn’t help much.
That’s the second Tenet reference we’ve had this war. Woo!
Convoy is crawling along, which would make it an easy target for infantry.
The radar is also active, so it’s screaming its position. Ukrainian pilots would be wise to avoid it.
You’re probably right! The scenario the interview discussed was different and not explicitly about the Ukraine situation–had to do with the possibility of using a tactical nuke to dispatch an enemy naval group. That’s the kind of case where you could have a nuclear strike against purely military targets. (That requires ignoring the effects of fallout, of course, which we shouldn’t. Though I don’t know what fallout from a water detonation looks like…)
I was actually thinking about the U.S.’s use of force (in a “changing the status que” or offensive capacity).
I also don’t want to imply that such a calculus is wrong to consider in regards when dealing with the same aggressor (i.e. will a negotiated peace with Putin embolden him to further military aggression). That has definitely been the case in the past.
Russia has a strategy for tactical nuke usage called “Escalate to De-Escalate” or “Escalate to win”. The theory being that they fire off a kiloton level tactical nuke at Ukraine and then make demands to freeze the conflict - or they will use further nukes.
One scenario discussed in the past 8 years is something along the lines of “Donbas war heats up again, Ukraine is winning, Russia fires small nuke to freeze the conflict and maintain its presence in Ukraine”. Of course someone would then say “but Russia is such a mean sexy conventional army beast, they’ll never get defeated by Ukraine in the battlefield”.
Well - here we are - and Russia does have a doctrine - which they have gamed out in military exercises - about using a small nuclear weapon on retreat to salvage strategic goals on the battlefield.
You hit on one of the big complexities of all of this, which is how to apply universal standards to situations that by definition are quite particular. The US has always acted, technically, in ways that we deem are illegal or unwarranted when used by others, but we justify it by pointing to the specific goals we have/causes we serve. Of course, the other guys do exactly the same thing. In the end, whoever has the might to make it stick and keep anyone from retaliating effectively seems to win.
Exercises are not the real thing, but as we have all observed here, perhaps the distinction is lost on Czar Putin, first (and with luck the last) of his line.
We too have small nukes, and probably more accurate, better targeted, and more effective (though the latter might be moot when you are talking nukes). nukes at that. Presumably the Russians know this. Therefore, the only reason they would go this route is if they were quite sure we would back down and not counter with our own strike. Of course, they may well believe that–it might even be true, who knows?
It´s really interesting how this is completely the opposite of what Putin wanted to achieve.
Due to its history, Ukraines national identity was rather weak, but that has changed over the last few years.
Link
One of Putins goals was to stop this development of an Ukrainian national identity and to coerce them back into the russian sphere of influence.
This backfired spectacularly…
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Yeah, I feel like the Ukrainians have now internalized a national identity which is literally based on “Go fuck yourself, Russia.”
Like, they’re gonna print that on their money.
I’m sure they (and we) have numerous doctrines to employ and justify tactical nukes. Frankly, such nukes wouldn’t exist without someone having developed a doctrine to employ them.
But don’t see a lot of rational reasons to use them at this point in the conflict. If we want to speculate on irrational or less rational behavior, sure it’s possible. It’s also possible they’ll use their strategic nukes if we go in that direction.
I agree with this here - Putin has already decisively lost on every goal he might’ve had.
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From TASS:
The Verkhovna Rada supports the introduction of peacekeeping forces into the territory of Ukraine, said the first vice-speaker of the parliament Oleksandr Korniyenko.
He also stated that the deputies demand " the immediate introduction of a no-fly zone over the territory of Ukraine ."
Does the no no fly zone zone rule get invoked when it’s Russia calling for one?
Also read (but haven’t yet found a good source for) that Transnistria has asked to have it’s independence from Moldova recognized after Moldova applied to join the UN. Transnistria is a breakaway region that already has Russian “peacekeepers” stationed there. It’s also just west of Odessa.
The Swedish source linked above claims that there is evidence that Russia is mobilizing more troops to send into Ukraine (above and beyond the 150K previously massed on the borders).
Haven’t seen that reported elsewhere, but makes sense to me - the existing forces seem to be essentially inadequate for the job, have already suffered heavy losses (if we’re to believe the Ukrainians) and are bogged down. The longer the war drags out, the more likely that Russia might actually be stalemated. So I’d expect massive reinforcements to roll in during the coming months to overwhelm Ukrainian resistance.
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They’re probably bringing in troops from the eastern provinces that won’t relate as much to the people they are ordered to murder. I think I’ve heard this one before.
