The Trump Administration and Syria

A close associate of the secretary of state says that Tillerson was not only “blind-sided by the Trump statement,” but “absolutely enraged that the White House and State Department weren’t on the same page.” Tillerson’s aides, I was told, were convinced that the true author of Trump’s statement was U.A.E. ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba, a close friend of Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner. “Rex put two-and-two together,” his close associate says, “and concluded that this absolutely vacuous kid was running a second foreign policy out of the White House family quarters. Otaiba weighed in with Jared and Jared weighed in with Trump. What a mess.” The Trump statement was nearly the last straw for Tillerson, this close associate explains: “Rex is just exhausted. He can’t get any of his appointments approved and is running around the world cleaning up after a president whose primary foreign policy adviser is a 31-year-old amateur.”

Worse yet, at least from Tillerson’s point of view, a White House official explained the difference between the two statements by telling the press to ignore the secretary of state. “Tillerson may initially have had a view,” a White House official told the Washington Post, “then the president has his view, and obviously the president’s view prevails.”

Or maybe not. While Trump’s June 9 statement signaled that the U.S. was tilting towards the Saudis and the UAE, Tillerson and Mattis have been tilting towards Qatar. And for good reason. “Every time we’ve asked the Qataris for something they’ve said ‘yes,’ which isn’t true for the Saudis,” the retired senior U.S. military officer with whom I spoke says. “It really started with the help the Qataris gave us in Libya, but it goes well beyond that. They’ve been absolutely first rate on ISIS. The Saudis, on the other hand, have been nothing but trouble – in Yemen, especially. Yemen has been a disaster, a stain. And now there’s this.”

This is pretty badass.

Badass and adorable!

-Tom

A video illustration of one of my favorite Winston Churchill quotes.
“Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result.”

Speaking with CNN’s Jake Tapper, Sebastian Gorka, a national security adviser to US President Donald Trump, said the administration had successfully brokered a cease-fire agreement by cooperating with Moscow and “Israel, with Jordan involved.”

https://twitter.com/lrozen/status/886654186036834309
https://twitter.com/mawilner/status/886653733999869957
https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/886624498866376704

58D chess.

Ah… so that’s what Putin pulled him aside for at the dinner.

So… I hold a Fellowship and through the work with it I’ve been heavily involved in The Lancet’s Commission on Syria, as described in this article. It’s a TON of work but is very interesting:

Anyhow, there’s a Q&A in the article that speaks to US policy with regards to Syria.

Q: Critics fault Obama for not using military intervention when Assad obviously crossed the proverbial “red line” in 2014. Is there any validity to the argument that it could have been a turning point in the Syrian conflict had the United States acted?

A: Everything became much more difficult when the Russians entered the war in 2015. And one of the critiques raised by many is that in 2014, with the United States’s refusal to cross that established red line, when proof was officially provided of Assad’s documented use of chemical weapons against civilian populations, the United States lost standing in the Middle East and in the international community. Many analysts suggest that the Russian entry is directly the result of the Americans failure to act a year earlier.

We ceased to be a player in the force fields of public opinion after that point. Although the United States deployed special forces or advisors to the conflict zone, and then later committed more significant military resources, the perception of US indifference has endured. Once the Russians swiftly established a major foothold in the country, the Syrian civil war became an indirect conflict between two major nuclear powers. That reality will always deflate (as it should) US interest in getting deeply involved in major military confrontations. So now we have this game of dynamic checkers in the sky—who’s in that space so we won’t go into it?

There are still ways in which the great powers can move and the others will get out of their way. However, the United States didn’t move. So, if there is a sense of bitterness at all in the Middle East toward the great powers it’s toward the UN, yes, but it’s particularly toward the United States.

The Q&A is with Jennifer Leaning, the Director of the FXB Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard. I first worked with her during Hurricane Katrina response. She’s an absolutely amazing person and has been a phenomenal mentor for me over the years.

That’s a compelling analysis, except for the one small detail of, um, what should we have done? It’s one thing, and maybe an accurate thing, to say our standing and our effectiveness suffered when we didn’t uphold our promise to act after Assad’s use of chemical weapons; that’s pretty hard to deny, considering that nearly everyone knows that making empty threats is a bad thing. But what could or should the US have done/ Intervening against Assad would have put us squarely in the middle of either supporting people that are at least as bad as the current regime in Syria, without even the saving grace of being a force for stability of a sorts and being a bit more inclusive than some of the Sunni factions, or conducting what would in effect be a multi-sided war against not only Assad but against specific groups opposed to Assad. In short, the only viable long-term approach I can see would have been to commit to the civil war on the side of one faction and commit, in turn, to wiping out everyone else.

Anything other than that would not, IMO, have been at all effective. One could argue I suppose that a sort of one-off cruise missile hit or something to that effect, just to punish Assad for his actions, might have assuaged some of the anger against the USA for not living up to its promises, but I still feel that would have been about as effective as it was when we finally did it not long ago (that is, not very effective at all).

The best thing we could have done would have been to not make threats in the first place.

Well, that’s the million dollar question, isn’t it? In the context of that interview…

Q: In retrospect, what kind of intervention could have taken place in Syria?

A: Syria has been known as a troubled, autocratic state with divisions between and among the population tightly controlled by the Baathist government of Bashar al Assad. So the context of chronic discord should have kept Syria on the international watch list. And even before 2011 it was clear to informed observers of Syria that there might be major distress migration from drought-affected northeastern regions of the country into the cities of the south and the west. The drought began in 2006 and caused the collapse of livelihoods; livestock died, crops failed. People decided to move out of necessity. Over a million rural Sunnis from this northeastern region—who are relatively poor, relatively uneducated—moved into the more prosperous Alawite cities. Sectarian and class issues, aggravated by vast overcrowding and stress on urban houses, schools, and jobs, underpinned the next chapters of discontent, protests, and ultimately complex civil war.

So, had early warning been in place, the sight of people moving into the cities in 2010 and early 2011 would have triggered an international alert about this forced migration and recognition that it spelled trouble.

We will explore some of the pivot points around this descent into war in the report. In a counterfactual long shot, out of context, it seems hazardous to raise choices leading to alternative realities. But there are a few flare points that we’re going to identify in our report, where, if there had been intervention of certain kinds, might have made a difference.

That seems about as reasonable as you can be, given the circumstances. Lots of “ifs” and “might haves.” Because, well, there is no magic bullet of course.

As I was trained as a historian, I tend to look at decisions people make in the context of their own time; it is fairly unhelpful at best to judge actions by contexts that are vastly different than the ones the people in question faced. Of course, with this decision, it’s very recent, and we have a much clearer view of the context; we also have a much stronger case to judge, accordingly.

In the context of 2014, it’s still a tough call, as the interview you cite implies. I do think most can agree, though, that making a “line in the sand” type promise and then not backing it up was, all in all, not the best move.

I think of the situation in Syria most often in terms of the situation in Rwanda when we spent months debating the use of the word genocide solely because if we were to admit that it was genocide, then the UN Charter compels us to prevent it and nobody wanted to get involved in a land war in Africa. While we Bannon’ed ourselves around the issue, millions of people died.

I think that Syria largely is the same case. We actively look for reasons not to get involved. It’s a terribly messy situation that is bringing discord and instability to all of Europe and to the US. Somewhere, there’s a threshold we’ll pass that makes us look up from our uh… Bannoning … and realize that it’s time to serve a greater cause.

I appreciate the use of ‘Bannon’ as a verb. Perhaps it will have the most lasting impact of the Scarramucci tenure.

I hear ya, but the kicker always is, are we doing something that is actually accomplishing anything towards that greater cause, or just doing something to, well, do something, and make ourselves feel better? Sometimes, maybe, the two can be the same; in the case of Rwanda, my impression was that it would have been quite difficult, at best, to project enough power to actually separate the warring factions and put an end to the killing. Does that mean we should not have tried? I don’t know. I guess it depends on whether you feel doing so and failing would have been better morally than not doing something and failing. I can definitely see a case for doing something that you know has a low to nonexistent chance of success because it’s the right thing to do, but I can also see the case being made against doing something that on the one hand is morally right in theory but which in practice will make things worse on the ground.

Syria seems full of that sort of thing. I suppose it comes down to whether one is optimistic about our ability to effect positive change, or not.

Ultimately, isn’t it about how we measure and judge the value of human life? 1996 America had the military ability to deploy a large enough force to halt the Rwandan genocide within days of its inception. The country didn’t have the will to do so. However, we’re more than willing to give away 10k American lives – and an estimated hundreds of thousands of Iraqi, Afghani, etc. lives == when somebody takes out 3k American lives on American soil.

Having spent a lot of time in the human rights community, the primary schism I see is between those who truly believe that all lives are equal and should be protected and treated as such and those who strongly believe that an American life is worth more than x number of non-American lives. The more exotic the non-American lives, the less value they’re willing to assign them.

Therein lies the entire crux of the xenophobia movement. Convince Americans that foreigners aren’t worth saving and they’ll never be motivated to stand up for causes that protect the lives of others. Most Americans likely do not realize that cities like Aleppo were modern, Western-style, cosmopolitan cities full of well-educated healthy people, in a culture steeped in the traditions of scientific and medical research and practice. Our government and media portray them as savage animals who are invading Europe. The truth is heartbreaking. I don’t know – maybe we just cannot fathom the level of collective grief.

One could argue that the entire reason we have governments at all is due to the need to find a collective solution to the tragedy of the commons. Governments exist so that as individuals, we can all give a tiny bit to solve problems that are beyond the scope of any individual. The question becomes: what are we willing to give and under what conditions?

There’s no immediate payback to getting involved in the conflict in Syria that a politician can sell to the American people. I would love to think we live in a country where a charismatic leader can put up an argument for the moral imperative we have to protect vulnerable populations. If we’re willing to give 435k American lives to liberate Western Europe from Nazi Germany and ~ 60k American lives to fight a proxy war against communism in Vietnam, what needs to happen for us to decide to risk ourselves to save hundreds of thousands of people in Syria or millions in Rwanda? Whatever it is, the value proposition is not there. As a country, we simply don’t think their lives are worth as much as ours. AND, this is in a context now where we fight so much remotely that there’s little chances we’d come anywhere close to the casualty count we’ve experienced in other conflicts over the past century.

Edit: I would add to this – having also worked for the US Government, where I had a lot of extremely intelligent, friendly, and interesting colleagues, I differed greatly from them in the fact that in my heart, I believe that citizens of other countries have the right to not be clandestinely interfered with by officers and agents of the US Government. Ultimately, that’s one of the main reasons that I left my job. It is the de facto stance of the USG that we can and should actively interfere in the lives of foreigners, on their soil, to further American interests. I don’t like that. It’s icky. I worked with two types of people who could live with it: a) the people who just forced themselves never to think about the implications of their work and b) people who were chest-thumping patriots who truly believed American lives to be worth more than the lives of others.

I hear you. I think you raise valid points, and important ones. That being said, and maybe this is just me being too pessimistic or not being idealistic enough, but I have a deep skepticism about the efficacy of most suggested military responses to these sorts of crises. Don’t get me wrong; there is a part of me that really, really wants to send in the flag and kick butt and take names, and yes, I do think on a moral level Rwandan or Syrian lives are worth the same as American lives. Whether that’s a viable argument to persuade people about national policy is another question, as many will argue that a nation’s priorities have to, by nature, put their own people ahead of others. I do think you can make a case for a more ecumenical approach, but it won’t be easy.

But my real concern is that when we speculate about how possible or practical military intervention might be, we are often IMO quite wrong. Did we have a lot of military power in 1996? Sure. But a crisis like Rwanda requires very specific types of power, in that case, strategic lift and logistical support sufficient to project a very large mobile force into the heart of a vast continent on very short notice. It varies, but our actual ability to put large numbers of “boots on the ground” places is often far less than people would like, or are aware of. Especially since the end of the Cold War and the rather hefty strategic reserves we used to keep, nowadays it’s hard to scrape up more than a brigade or regimental combat team for short notice deployment, with all the trimmings, AFAIK. I am not 100% up on stuff any more, so it could be different, but the trends have been down, not up, in terms of forces on hand ready to move in large numbers. And Rwanda IMO would have taken a lot of people.

Ditto for Syria. The force we have in abundance is stuff like cruise missiles and air sorties. Not the most useful for seriously affecting what happens in a complex environment. Helpful, even essential, but not sufficient, again IMO. But the bigger problem in Syria is, who do you help? Hell, Assad is a horrible monster, no doubt about it. He’s also probably the only reason a bunch of minority groups in Syria haven’t been eradicated by their countrymen–Druze, Alawites, Shiites, who knows who else. The people opposing him have damn good reason to oppose him, but too often also feel they have damn good reasons to hate everyone else, too. If you believe all Syrians who aren’t actively being war criminals deserve safety and support–and that’s certainly a good thing to believe–you have to figure out a way to intervene that doesn’t simply substitute one set of victims for another.

One could argue, I suppose, that no matter what it’d be better than the status quo, because (supposing we could muster the force/support/will to intervene with the power necessary) we’d at least be trying to stabilize things. I remain skeptical that such a balancing act is possible in the modern US diplomatic and military landscape. I think we’d just make it worse, though I fully understand that as bad as it is already, it’s not unreasonable to argue that any change might be better.

But on the broader point you make, yes, I have to agree–the cavalier manner in which Americans view everything solely in terms of US national interest–and usually in a very shallow and often counter-productive way–is more than annoying. It’s disturbing, not the least because it does not work. If constant intervention, manipulation, and domination of others in the US interest was actually effective, we would be a frickin’ powerful empire with obedient satraps and docile viceroys everywhere. But that ain’t the case. Our meddling is usually counterproductive, so even from a purely utilitarian point of view it’s a bad idea. Pick and choose and do it well, which in effect means do it on a limited basis, because if you try to just generically and reflexively muck around everywhere, you won’t be very successful, as we’ve seen.

Morally? Nation states do have a somewhat different moral landscape than individuals; they have to spy on others, and do things that individuals would not be expected to do. But I wholeheartedly agree that it is unhealthy to create an international environment where nations can justify anything in the name of national interest. What the USA never stops to think about is that, if we can argue it’s ok because 'Murica, others will argue that what they do is ok because of whatever jingoistic nickname they have for themselves. Of course, we view all other nations as effectively invalid and meaningless.

When I worked with the military and intelligence community, it was during the Cold War. The stuff I was focused on was pretty mainstream–no Contras or narco-terrorists or fixed elections or what not. Just the USSR and its military establishment. But even then, there was a lot that made me uncomfortable, and I’m pretty happy I’m long gone from that sort of environment.

The question about whether any US intervention could have been perfect or even more good than bad, misses the point. We had a hard choice to be involved or be irrelevant, and we chose irrelevant. That’s a hard reputation to undo, and if we want to become involved and influential again it will likely cost a lot of innocent blood also.

There has been a lot of focus on the American right-wing and how they seem to be insensitive to human rights on a larger scale or seem hypocritical about protections and norms. They don’t care about protecting gays until their own son comes out, they don’t care about drug addiction until it affects their friends, they don’t support Medicaid until their mom needs help with her bills, etc. I think it’s mostly about the psychology of fear and being under attack. Like this:

“The news is crazy,” Bakker said. “Evil, evil, evil. And how they’re trying to destroy the president and his family, God is speaking to me about it. […] There is coming a time when the Bible says there will be no food to eat,” he warned. “And if you do get any food, you have to sign over to the Antichrist; that means you’ve sold your soul to the devil. You say it’ll never be that evil. […] Half of America hates Jesus Christ. Half of America wants to destroy the president because he’s standing up to save babies, that he stands up for religious freedom […] It’s time to be prepared because there’s coming a time when it will be too late to get ready and that’s going to be a hellish 42 months on planet Earth,” Bakker said.

If your media environment surrounds you with things to feel afraid of all the time, whether it is immigrants, or ebola, or losing your guns, or secret gays in your daughters bathroom, or sharia, then you structure your life priorities based on that fear response. When you are about to lose everything, reacting to that threat is the only thing you can do.

This takes away your ability to have empathy, or to think about long-term problems, or to make allies and negotiate in good faith and be a rational actor. It makes for reliable committed voters, but terrible leaders and citizens. It’s like Mazlow’s Hierarchy of human rights applied to social relations.

  1. I and my family have rights and needs and those are my full-time concern.
  2. Other people like me have rights and I will put out some effort to support them.
  3. People not like me or far away don’t matter and I will not risk anything to help them.

So that guy is like, what, an evil colonel sanders?