Of course it can be too high, particularly if there is no strategy beyond counterinsurgency fire chasing being applied with the American presence. The relative success of the surge is not a testament to American effectiveness in theater. It is, in fact, a condemnation of how incredibly fucked our approach prior to that was. The Iraqis may or may not end up in the grip of genocidal lunatics after our departure, but it is part of the same arrogance that landed us there to think the possibility of that outcome is mostly under our control.
Bush steadfastly refused to address political solutions to political problems. The Iraq he dreamed of was a united, strong Iraq that was closely allied to the United States. The possibilities that were actually available after a few years of mismanaged occupation (if in fact there were ever others) were a weak, divided Iraq pulled between the regional powers or a united, stable Iraq under a new strongman, both with (at best) a sense of ambivalence towards the US role in their country. Currently, we are coasting towards the latter with Maliki’s successful consolidation of power. By refusing to engage with Iran and everyone else who should have been at the negotiating table early on, he burned bridges that cannot be rebuilt with a simple change of president on our part.
I agree with the training strategy, but I think that the army was not ready to stand on its own after the training was underway. If the Iraqis are in a place to protect themselves from the previously mentioned atrocities, then I fully endorse lending intel/support forces until that branch of the military is caught up with their fighting forces. And, I would endorse moving our fighting forces out of harm’s way in their cities.
And popular public opinion polls by the Iraqis doesn’t make it the right thing to do. Come on, where are all of the moral idealists out there?
The moral idealists are in plastic bags and pine boxes right alongside a whole bunch of kids who had no idea what the hell was going on right up until they melted into a humvee dashboard. I don’t even want to imagine what the fate of the Iraqi idealist was, hundreds of thousands of dead later. There are, however, plenty of blowhards willing to encode their avarice in morals, who are always glad to spend more blood and treasure so long as the former belongs to others and the latter can be substantially redistributed their way. I’m sure many of them will find much to love about the modern day stab in the back theory you are laying the groundwork for here. Either way, one of the positive things to come out of our Iraqi adventure is the extent to which our failure has been documented, the best efforts of Bush and Obama notwithstanding. That evidence speaks to the broader idea of the end of the Pax Americana as it was understood by its neocolonialist architects, and the beginning of a frightening new age where we as a people are no longer able to efficiently outsource the costs of our way of life. Better now than later, anyway.
At any rate, Iraqis are not children that require patronizing sentiments. They don’t want America out because they are fickle and ungrateful, they want us out because they know that come whatever may, no real progress can be had unless it is on their own. Victims of American concern (and that of any other empire) worldwide can attest to the wisdom of that view. Amputation is always preferable to gangrene.