Today, the richest 1 percent account for 24 percent of the nation’s income.
The Great Compression ended in the 1970s. Wages stagnated, inflation raged, and by the decade’s end, income inequality had started to rise. From 1980 to 2005, more than 80 percent of total increase in Americans’ income went to the top 1 percent.
-according to the Central Intelligence Agency (whose patriotism I hesitate to question), income distribution in the United States is more unequal than in Guyana, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and roughly on par with Uruguay, Argentina, and Ecuador. Income inequality is actually declining in Latin America even as it continues to increase in the United States. Economically speaking, the richest nation on earth is starting to resemble a banana republic. The main difference is that the United States is big enough to maintain geographic distance between the villa-dweller and the beggar.
-The trouble is that the kinds of jobs computers tend to eliminate are those that require some thinking but not a lot—precisely the niche previously occupied by moderately skilled middle-class laborers.
But MIT economist David Autor readily concedes that computer-driven job polarization can’t possibly explain the entire trend toward income inequality in the United States, because income inequality is much greater in the United States than it is in Europe.
-[T]he narrowly economic focus of most previous studies of inequality has caused them to miss what may be the most important single influence on the changing U.S. income distribution over the past half-century—the contrasting policy choices of Democratic and Republican presidents. Under Republican administrations, real income growth for the lower- and middle-classes has consistently lagged well behind the income growth rate for the rich—and well behind the income growth rate for the lower and middle classes themselves under Democratic administrations.
-But the culprit, they say, is not so much partisan politics (i.e., Republicans) as institutional changes in the way Washington does business (i.e., lobbyists). “Of the billions of dollars now spent every year on politics,” Hacker and Pierson point out in their new book, Winner-Take-All Politics, “only a fairly small fraction is directly connected to electoral contests. The bulk of it goes to lobbying….”
The resultant power shift, they argue, affects Democrats and Republicans alike.
-The Great Divergence coincided with a dramatic decline in the power of organized labor. Union members now account for about 12 percent of the workforce, down from about 20 percent in 1983. When you exclude public-employee unions (whose membership has been growing), union membership has dropped to a mere 7.5 percent of the private-sector workforce.
-In their influential 2007 paper, “Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America,” Levy and Temin regard unions not merely as organizations that struck wage bargains for a specific number of workers but rather as institutions that, prior to the Great Divergence, played a significant role in the workings of government. “If our interpretation is correct,” they wrote, “no rebalancing of the labor force can restore a more equal distribution of productivity gains without government intervention and changes in private sector behavior.”
-To summarize: Taft-Hartley halted labor’s growth and then, over many decades, enabled management to roll back its previous gains.
-It’s no accident that the social democracies, Sweden, France, and Germany, which kept on paying high wages, now have more industry than the U.S. or the UK. … [T]hat’s what the U.S. and the UK did: they smashed the unions, in the belief that they had to compete on cost. The result? They quickly ended up wrecking their industrial base.
-But the U.S. tech sector doesn’t, for the most part, employ lower-skilled workers. It employs higher-skilled workers. If trade with China were throwing anybody out of work, Lawrence concluded, “it is likely to be … workers with relatively high wages.” And in fact, Lawrence wrote, during the first decade of the 21st century there was very little measured increase in income inequality “by skill, education, unionization or occupation.”
-Trade does not appear to have contributed much to the Great Divergence through the mid-1990s. Since then, it may have contributed to it more significantly, though we don’t yet have the data to quantify it.
-Who are the Stinking Rich? Their average annual income is about $7 million. Most of them likely work in finance, a sector of the U.S. economy that saw its share of corporate profits rise from less than 10 percent in 1979 to more than 40 percent in the aughts.
-An explanation of how finance came to take over the U.S. economy would require its own Slate series, but Saez, Hacker and Pierson argue plausibly that the industry’s deregulation (and the protection it received from a few well-placed Democrats like New York Sen. Chuck Schumer) played a large role.
-At a time when the workforce needed to be smarter, Americans got dumber. Or rather: Americans got smarter at a much slower rate than they did during previous periods of technological change (and also at a much slower rate than many other industrialized democracies did).
-Between 1900 and the mid-1970s, U.S. incomes became dramatically more equal while educational attainment climbed. But starting in the mid-1970s and continuing to today, incomes became dramatically less equal while educational attainment stagnated.
Summary of causes:
– Race and gender is responsible for none of it, and single parenthood is responsible for virtually none of it.
– Immigration is responsible for 5 percent.
– The imagined uniqueness of computers as a transformative technology is responsible for none of it.
– Tax policy is responsible for 5 percent.
– The decline of labor is responsible for 20 percent.
– Trade is responsible for 10 percent.
– Wall Street and corporate boards’ pampering of the Stinking Rich is responsible for 30 percent.
– Various failures in our education system are responsible for 30 percent.
One important thing he doesn’t talk about(but may be mentioned in this thread) is the shifting of the entire political spectrum. When a party continues to regularly win most elections and hold more offices, the opposition must shift its ideology to suit electors’ voting habits. So if conservatives are in power more of the time and more offices of government, then liberal ideology must shift right to capture more votes.
Anyway, why is income inequality bad? It’s not if you’re a fan of communism. If it wasn’t for income inequality, we would’ve never enjoyed the writings of one Karl Marx and a certain South American doctor would not have dropped his medic bag to pick up an AK-47.