Just FYI – I still think the Japanese navy could have won. We had luck, skill, and courage and we say the American victory in the pacific was inevitable cheapens our inevitable and difficult struggle.
And every few years I’ll post that comment.
Did Japan have a USS Johnston? No, they did not. Ipso facto they could not have won.
I mean, if every Japanese bomber always rolled a natural 20 and hit a ship’s ammo room, and if every American plane always rolled a natural 1 and missed, and that continued throughout the entire war, and happened in politics in addition to in battle, then yes? With enough good luck anything is possible. Likely though? Not really. You have the massive differences of production, the simple fact that Japan couldn’t adequately fuel their navy, the issue that in 1945 the Soviet Union still comes through and stomps them, the nuclear bombs also coming in 1945, etc. etc. It’s just a long list of fatalities that all somehow need to be avoided, Long Live the Queen style.
Edit: you should write click-bait for military history websites. This stuff is like catnip to us. :D
In an alternate timeline where Germany wasn’t stopped when they were, maybe. Once Germany was stopped, the entire world could focus on Japan, and as far as the Allies went, we did. They had no chance. They especially had no chance when Russia joined the Allies against them. In fact it’s speculated that Russia joining in had as much sway for their surrender as us dropping atomic bombs did. They feared them that much.
There -could- have been alternate timelines where they did NOT surrender or did not do so until much later, which would have devastated much more of the Japanese mainland, people, economy, etc.
Saying America’s victory in the Pacific was inevitable does not take away from the immense skill and bravery of American troops - without that skill and bravery the victory would have never happened. America could have surrendered after Pearl Harbour and that would have been that.
This site has some really interesting information on why Japan lost.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm
At the beginning of the Second World War, the Japanese Navy (or, in the Japanese language, Nihon Kaigun , or even Teikoku Kaigun , the Imperial Navy) was arguably the most powerful navy in the world. Its naval aviation corps, consisting of 10 aircraft carriers and 1500 topnotch aviators, was the most highly trained and proficient force of its kind. Its 11 (soon to be 12) battleships were among the most powerful in the world. And its surface forces, armed with the superb 24" Type 93 (Long Lance) torpedo, were incomparable night fighters.
but
The Pacific War was also very much a war of merchant shipping, in that practically everything needed to defend and/or assault the various island outposts of the Japanese Empire had to be transported across vast stretches of ocean. Japan also had to maintain her vital supply lanes to places like Borneo and Java in order to keep her industrial base supplied. A look at the relative shipbuilding output of the two antagonists is enlightening.
Merchant Ship Production (in tons)
Year United States Japan 1939 376,419 320,466 1940 528,697 293,612 1941 1,031,974 210,373 1942 5,479,766 260,059 1943 11,448,360 769,085 1944 9,288,156 1,699,203 1945 5,839,858 599,563 Total 33,993,230 4,152,361 Every time I look at these number, I just shake my head in amazement. The United States built more merchant shipping in the first four and a half months of 1943 than Japan put in the water in seven years . The other really interesting thing is that there was really no noticeable increase in Japanese merchant vessel building until 1943, by which time it was already way too late to stop the bleeding. Just as with their escort building programs, the Japanese were operating under a tragically flawed national strategy that dictated that the war with the United States would be a short one. Again, the United States had to devote a lot of the merchant shipping it built to replace the losses inflicted by the German U-Boats. But it is no joke to say that we were literally building ships faster than anybody could sink them, and still have enough left over to carry mountains of material to the most God-forsaken, desolate stretches of the Pacific. Those Polynesian cargo cults didn’t start for no reason, and it was American merchant vessels in their thousands which delivered the majority of this seemingly divinely profligate largesse to backwaters which had probably never seen so much as a can opener before.
Japan could have won, if the following happened.
- They stayed out of China. China is what drew the US into the war.
- They avoid US oil sanctions and the US stays a hard neutral
- they don’t get too greedy (but then this wouldn’t be post-1905 Imperial Japan)
As soon as the US declared war on Japan it was over for Japan. Japan was capable of stomping the colonial B-teams of Britain/France out in the Pacific, and could have handled the A-team adequately, but America was too much.
The Axis was so ill-equipped to fight a long war.
Not a win, but if the Japanese fared better in a few more Navy battles (particularly Midway) they probably could have prolonged the war by another year or two and avoided total surrender
True. There is a comedian joke that men over 40 either get really into military history, or really into smoking meats.
Brute Force by John Ellis is an excellent volume on the inevitable-ness of an Allied victory over the Axis and spends some time on the Pacific theatre.
I think this is the key part I’d challenge. First of all, this:
Second of all, it’s no secret that the Japanese Empire was not exactly benevolent to those they conquered. The skill and sacrifice of the Allied (not just American) forces made those occupations as short as they did, and that alone is worth recognizing, regardless of whether or not the Japanese had a chance at “victory”.
In fact, it’s hard to see what exactly a Japanese victory would have been. The plan (such as it was) was that Americans wouldn’t have the stomach for a long war and would broker some kind of deal (after sufficient losses in quick succession) whereby Japan would get to keep some of their conquests. This was a catastrophic misreading of their enemy, and was further compounded by the decision to open the war with a surprise attack.
I heartily suggest the following books, for a great look at the Japanese perspective:
Japan 1941, by Eri Hotta. Why How did the Japanese end up in a war that most of them realized they couldn’t win? (Spoiler warning: it’s really more of a “how” than a “why”, and that’s exactly the problem.)
Shattered Sword, by Anthony P. Tully and Jonathan Parshall. AFAIK the best English language history of the Japanese experience at Midway. A fascinating look the ramifications of Japanese doctrine (which was significantly derived from the societal conditions also described by Hotta, above) during the most important naval battle of the war.
Edit: also this:
It’s why Spam is the “national” dish of Hawaii.
Exactly this. After the first couple of years the production differences were so absurdly lopsided, and the US was making up it’s various technical deficiencies(torpedo issues and the like) that militarily victory was inevitable. Japan’s only hope would have been the short war strategy working out, or once long war became inevitable finding a way to turn the US populace against the war.
Or yes, to whoever called out an option where the US doesn’t enter the war at all because Japan was a little more restrained in their expansion. However, it seems to me that leaving the Philippines alone long term wasn’t a thing they’d have been willing to do for strategic reasons.
What does a Japanese victory even supposed to look like? Is it the US deciding they had enough, Japan can just keep China and all the rest of their territorial gains? How do we reach that outcome, considering the war against Germany had a much higher cost in both lives and dollars, and the Allies never considered quitting?
It probably would have been much easier to ignore the plight of most of the people conquered by the Japanese Empire compared to the much whiter Europeans and therefore have been more plausible to get to the point where we were fine with Japan keeping a whole bunch of territory.
It’s pretty much like with the Germans, in some ways. The only way they could “win” is if their war aims in the first place had been radically different, in which case…there probably would not have been a war.
The Japanese went to war with the US and UK largely to try to break the impasse in China, which in turn was caused largely by their lack of resources as well as the resistance of the Chinese and the sheer scale of the struggle on the mainland. Had the Japanese not been knee-deep in China, they would not have needed to take on the Americans and the Commonwealth, at least, not like they did. Yet to theoretically win such a war, they would have to be able to fight it without the millstone of the China war around their neck.
The other premise for a Japanese victory of sorts would be that they were able to deliver such a military and psychological blow in 1941 that the USA would cave in to their demands. The only way that seems even remotely likely would be if FDR had lost the election in 1940, the government had reverted to strict isolationism, and the pro-German elements in American business had cut deals with the Germans, etc. Hardly a likely set of circumstances, though not totally impossible.
The Germans faced similar issues, in that all of the ways people come up with for Germany to have won involve them not being driven by Nazi ideology. In which case, there probably would not have been the type of war they actually got themselves into. Without the Nazis, a more traditional military resurgence in Germany in the thirties could have led to re-occupying the Rhineland, maybe even absorbing Austria and the Sudetenland, without triggering any war. Absent the Nazi ideological pressures, some form of “Finlandized” Poland might even have been feasible. More importantly, though, without the racist and genocidal push of the Nazis, the Germans could have invaded France, done pretty much what they did historically, and then sat tight and forced a peace on the British by not pouring everything into a disastrous war with the USSR. But they Nazis, and their ideology drove them to constantly over-extend, sort of like the Japanese. Once they invaded the USSR, it was pretty much hopeless for them in the long run, as long as the Russians fought back strongly. Which they did.
I’m with the consensus, if Germany had beaten Russia, then combined industrialist and scientific capacity of Germany, might have changed the war in the Pacific. Because US production would have focused on making merchant ships and destroyers to protect against subs.
But Japan by itself no chance.
If finally finished the last two seasons of Man in the High Castle. I found myself really wishing that Amazon would make a prequel to the show. I’d like to see how Germany/Japan won the war, and see how the early resistance say 45-50 happened.
I’m about halfway through Dan Carlin’s Supernova in the East about the Pacific War, he makes the maybe not entirely accurate but amusing comparison of Japan getting hooked on colonialism like a drug. First with Manchuria then China. After that they needed the resources from South East Asia.
There is an interesting alt-history where Japan only declares war on the Commonwealth and invades Malaysia and the DEI. You can play this out in World in Flames - but inevitably the chit draws for US entry into the war get too high so you have a delayed entry, but you can’t stop it.
It’s likely Japan forcing the US into the war sealed the fate of Germany and Japan.
The one thing though i’ve never really understood is why Japan invaded China. There seems no more quixotic misadventure, to gloss over the horrors of what that meant. Not the least of which reasons their ground doctrines and equipment were arguably the worst of the major combatants.
My understanding, which is admittedly limited, is that Japan’s interest in China was part of a long history of interaction with the mainland, going back centuries, coupled with the relatively sudden rise of Japanese military capability after the Meiji Restoration. As in, they had a grudge and suddenly had the means to do something about it. At least, that seems to be some of it.
The numbers just don’t work out for anyone from the era winning a war with the United States.
That doesn’t detract from the sacrifices. Those sacrifices are part of why Japan’s defeat was inevitable.
Now Japan could’ve drawn things out quite a bit. If Midway had gone differently the US would’ve been much harder pressed to push things to their conclusion when they did if they lost their carriers and didn’t cripple the IJN. But the reality is that no one at the time could really take the war to the US mainland and not doing so meant you couldn’t possibly win.
The war could’ve gone on longer, but once Germany had lost it was only a matter of time before the Soviets got involved. Japan couldn’t win a land war with the USSR. It would just be a matter of time before they were stuck in the homeland/Philippines and the entire Royal Navy and USN Atlantic Fleet rolled in on them.
The fatal mistake Japan made imo, was they made it personal. Pearl Harbor doomed them. They created an implacable foe that would never, ever forgive them or capitulate. And that foe was the greatest industrial powerhouse in human history with nearly unlimited resources on their home soil that was immune to attack. Japan’s entire plan was the opposite. They completely misunderstood their adversary. They saw divisions to be exploited without realizing they would galvanize all those groups against them.