That Humvee charge needed Ride Of The Valkyries.
No, they fire 40mm grenades at 400 rounds/minute
To expand on what Lunch and others have said, you’re looking at two primary guns for the humvee. The one he is talking about is the Mk 19 grenade launcher, and you’ll note there’s a big difference between the theoretical or cyclic max rate of fire (400/min) and the actual “practical” rate (40-60 tops), more than likely limited by the size of the ammo cases being used (32 or 48 rounds). IRL you’ll probably see most gunners never go near that “practical” limit for a variety of reasons. The High Explosive/Dual Purpose round most commonly used is supposed to have the benefits of a personnel-clearing round with a bit of penetration for anti vehicle/enemy position use, but I’d say it’s unremarkable at best in both capacities.
It’s also a temperamental little bitch when maintained by inexperienced gunners, or (as in the case of the show) when they give you lubricant that’s not up to the task. At that time period, I would imagine they were equipped with CLP oil based lube, which is unsuited to desert climates/dust and not particularly good for big guns. Since then, we’ve switched to MILITEC (lithium based, I think) for the light guns for the most part and ensured that the LSA (silicon based, may be referred to as “sperm” or any of the apparently infinite variations thereof) they were so excited to get ahold of in the show is much more plentiful for big guns. The trick with the latter is that it lacks CLP’s preservative qualities, and in fact actively corrodes on a long enough timeline. EG, don’t try to use it to store the guns, just to shoot them (and for that, I don’t think it can be beaten with anything that’s reasonably affordable). For personal weapons, I preferred CLP for cleaning, and very light amounts of it for lubrication over militec, but there’s probably not any scientific reason not to like militec.
The other gun is the M2 .50 cal machine gun. It does some remarkable things to light armor and cement, particularly when it’s loaded up with SLAP sabot rounds designed for that purpose. It’s no fun being personnel in the open for that one, or light vehicles for that matter.
Every now and then you’ll see a relatively light 240G machine gun on a turret or (god forbid) some poor bastard with his M249 SAW. But those two above are the meat of humvee teams.
Usually vehicle units try to make sure every team has one of each, since they complement each other well. The .50 chews up what it can in a linear manner, and the Mk19 takes rooftops and general indirect fire responsibilities.
Can’t recall anything specific off-hand; you can find plenty of videos that feature some amount of traffic (there’s a rather infamous 8-minute ammo dump explosion video from '03 I think it is, the one that was just outside of Baghdad, taken from a bunker on the base that features a bit of radio traffic and grunts talking). Most videos have terrible audio capability, so capturing radio traffic over inconsistent comms a lot of the time is unintelligible. Closest thing maybe would be air combat recordings, which you can find quite a bit of (or police scanners I guess). I guess another example is the AC-130 video from Afghanistan, which COD4 rips from.
Just got caught up with the last 2 episodes as I was out of town a lot. The “confrontation” scene does seem a bit hokey. Still, show is still pretty good.
— Alan
In the Nasiriyah fight Eddy wound up firing so many grenades from his M-203 that the plastic handles started melting. Charlie company had 18 dead and 14 wounded on that day.
So LK, since the show offers no explanations for the Iraqi’s charging road blocks after recieving warning fire, did you ever run into a situation like this while you were there? Or heard about similar incidents?
Also, the Doc has some huge balls for telling Encino Man he’s incompotent to his face. Just a side question here: since he’s a Navy Corpsment I assume he’s exempt from the Marine Grooming Standards?
Mixed feelings about this episode. Too much dialogue that seemed unrealistic and speech-like. The whole “liberty is tough” discussion between the Colonel and the US officer that was with the Iraqi freedom brigade did not seem authentic. I can see the series slowly moving into the 90% of all commanding officers are screwed up and we loveable grunts bear the burden. And it’s starting to have a Mutiny on the Bounty vibe as well.
I write all of this not having read the book, so not sure where we are headed.
A lot of the actual people who appears in the show including Trombley:
We had numerous incidents, in Fallujah’s post Phantom Storm peacekeeping environment, were Iraqis where circumstantially prevented from being aware of the roadblock, whether because the layout of roads and buildings hampered visibility, the sun was in their eyes, or any of the other million things that can interfere. Keep in mind that a lot of ours were foot troops alone, so we had to be that much more paranoid and obvious.
By the time we got there in 05, escalation of force protocols were much more clearly defined. Our fixed positions and vehicle based roadblocks always used some variation of a “serpentine” to channelize and slow vehicles (since many of ours were checkpoints, not just roadblocks). We had a range of nonlethal options depending on the amount of time available and where you were, with fixed positions and mobile units using smoke, popup flares, air horns, and the ever popular hand gesture for stop (it looks like the western OK symbol) and a verbal warning). Often the next step, merely pointing the weapons, was sufficient to make them stop. After that the ideal sequence is tire, grill, windshield.
Without exception, every single vehicle that was fired on stopped unless they actually had hostile intent. Well, except for the British “other than coalition forces” (eg special forces or mercenaries) in unmarked armored land rovers who had notified our higher (much higher) chain they were coming through, and the message was never relayed to where they were passing (and they had no apparent awareness of the comm protocols/TACS in the AO). They stopped and returned fire, and then eventually drove away in what had to be the most surreal thing my Co. experienced that deployment. No one was hurt, although from what I understand the subsequent profanity laden English/Scottish rants on the higher level radio TACS made quite a few people blush.
Also, the Doc has some huge balls for telling Encino Man he’s incompotent to his face. Just a side question here: since he’s a Navy Corpsment I assume he’s exempt from the Marine Grooming Standards?
That’s correct. They can’t grow a beard or anything, but they have more generous moustache standards. The insubordinate corpsman is a treasured pain in the ass for everyone no matter what their place in the chain of command. One of the first challenges when I became a squad leader was developing a working relationship with my doc, because they know exactly the limits of your authority with them and how far you’d have to bust your ass or they would have to fuck up for it to be dealt with. Sometimes you get the “fake marine” kind, and at the other extreme there’s the “fuck you I’m in the Navy” sort. I’ll take the latter any day, although certainly something in between is preferable.
Well, I’m assuming Wright reconstructed most of those parts from secondhand accounts, so I’m not surprised that they sound less genuine. And I know during our deployments there were a number of times when those “mutiny on the bounty” chats were had with our command and passed down, when morale was low and shit was hitting the fan.
From my perspective, I really don’t see it as unduly harsh now that it’s moved away from the Encino and America show (or at least I’ve gotten used to them). I know officers and enlisted in positions of responsibility who are at least as worthless as they are…for me that inspiring speech Encino gives the co. was perfect, as was (on a different note) the awkward interaction between shadier Iraqi units/leaders and pissed off Marines not fully onboard with the hearts and minds stuff.
Of course, when I think back on it there were plenty who were good at their jobs…the interesting thing is how memory seizes on the bad and remembers it out of proportion. Naturally, I wouldn’t expect a journalist looking for a story to be able to resist the temptation. I also wouldn’t expect to see eye to eye on it with virtually any former officer who was worth a damn.
I think part of the problem I had with this episode and the direction the series seems to be going in is that what makes USMC a bit different from other armed services is that the NCO is very important to the mission and most officers rely heavily on the NCO and SNCO to do a lot of things. So a complex relationship is way too one dimensional (hasn’t even gotten two-dimensional) except for the LT and his platoon. Squad leaders and platoon SGTs were in synch in good platoons. Company 1st sgt, company GYSGT, CO, and XOs were in synch in good companies. This is all glossed over in the series so far.
The most troublesome part for me is the depiction that medals are the motivating force for most of the officers in the show. This is just silly to me as a former USMC infantry officer. That was probably the last thing we worried about. Now, we did want to make sure that our Marines were cited for heroism when that was appropriate. And we wanted to make sure that all of our Marines made it back in one piece (a throw-away line in the series when Alpha returns from their assignment, but that was a very realistic assessment between two officers). But the idea that 99% of the officers were doing medal calculations is just nonsense, but that is how the series is slanted so far.
Again, I am biased, hehe.
Good article with some interesting making of commentary. Namibia and cgi, and some interesting reflection from Fick. I say interesting because if you don’t want your experiences scrutinized, don’t write a book about them.
I agree with you, but I don’t see how that invalidates what appears to be going on in 1st recon. If anything, Wright went the extra mile to try to include Patterson’s company as a counterpoint, at least from where I’m sitting. The good co/bad co leadership thing has two sides, and it just happens that Bravo has more of the latter.
The most troublesome part for me is the depiction that medals are the motivating force for most of the officers in the show. This is just silly to me as a former USMC infantry officer. That was probably the last thing we worried about. Now, we did want to make sure that our Marines were cited for heroism when that was appropriate. And we wanted to make sure that all of our Marines made it back in one piece (a throw-away line in the series when Alpha returns from their assignment, but that was a very realistic assessment between two officers). But the idea that 99% of the officers were doing medal calculations is just nonsense, but that is how the series is slanted so far.
I don’t know how you’re getting such a harsh assessment out of it, it’s almost like we’re watching a different show sometimes. Anyways, I’d say given my experiences the aggressive incompetence + medal chasing tends to go hand in hand. One of the running jokes I had with my lieutenant was to relay his orders “The sir thinks he sees a NAM around the corner, go get it for him”.
I think you would be amazed to see some of the frankly disgusting attempts to justify higher level awards for senior Marines that I’ve lived through. Not so much the “get marines killed recklessly” kind (although there were those in some instances, but they are harder to pin motivations on since you can’t see the strategic picture as clearly as you can envision your future dead marines), but the “after shit has gone down, how did some motherfucker whose contribution was being nominally in charge of the people who actually did something amazing get a fucking medal for it tiered exactly above what any of his men is getting?”.
This is from the book:
While Doc Bryan is not technically a Marine, he is a product of the Navy’s most elite special-warfare training and could have chosen to have been placed with either Navy SEALS or a Marine Recon unit. Doc Bryan, who arguably has better combat training than many Recon Marines…
Wright could argue that, but he’d be wasting his time. I think I know what he meant to say, but that statement is very misleading. Now, Bryan could have been some kind of Navy SEAL training dropout, but otherwise he has the standard corpsman training +/- that elite paramedical course whose name escapes me (the one where they have to shoot a goat at the end and then treat it? I don’t really know how common that is, all of the recon corpsmen I knew had done it though, it’s called delta something or other), the SARC special forces/recon training, and the ancillary coursework (jump, dive, etc) that recon provides. That does give him a huge range of experience that most Marines and certainly many recon Marines will never have, even once you sort out the medical only stuff (they just have a great training track for elite corpsmen, from what I’ve seen).
EDIT: oh yeah, and Fleet Marine Force’s 7 weeks of intensive “being in the Marine Corps” training. I was continually impressed/appalled at the sort of things corpsmen were forced to learn to earn their FMF pin.
But comparing him in combat “training” or possible combat efficacy to be inferred in that is comparing apples and oranges. They’re simply different jobs, with a lot of crossover but not the kind Wright appears to suggest.
Also, here’s one other point in support of Generation Kill: the current Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps [hates it](MCT: Did you watch the new HBO mini-series “Generation Kill”?
Yeah, I did — I didn’t like it. I watched 15 minutes of it, and it did not portray the Marine Corps. I thought it was a slap in the face to the Marine Corps, especially when you’ve got Marines that know that doesn’t portray a unit in the Marine Corps, from the leadership down.
I watched it for 15 minutes, and even my wife watched it with me. My wife said, “This is not the Marine Corps.” She said, “This is not the Marine Corps that I grew up around.”
I said, “No, it’s not.” And I turned it off.
It does not portray the great things that these Marines are doing today. I can tell you all about those things, because we witness it throughout the Marine Corps. One example is the wounded warriors in the hospital. They just want to get back to their unit. They’re not concerned about their wounds.
I can tell you, I’ve been truly blessed to be able to serve with these great Marines that we have in our Marine Corps today, and they continue the legacy of our Marines that came before them.
And that’s another thing: The Marine Corps is all about legacy. They never want to let the last generation down. That’s why they do great things in the Marine Corps today, and they will continue to do it long after I’m gone. Marines will continue the legacy, because that’s the way it is.)
Don’t get me wrong, Sgt. Maj. Kent is an all star in my book, especially compared to his predecessor. But what he says here pretty much seals the deal for me.
LK is correct - comparing SEAL training to recon Marine training is apples and oranges. My last duty station was as an officer at MCRD in San Diego. We did field training at the same place that SEALs did theirs when they couldn’t use their normal base in San Diego. Was interesting to see, hehe.
Now if you want a beach reconned or some harbor mines taken out, SEALS are the people to call.
Oh I agree with this. But this sort of after action stuff isn’t the same as the I am going to call in close air support on my Company because I want a medal kind. I think we agree here.
Actually I was thinking about how perspective clouds military experience. I was the fire support coordinator for our second command group in our battalion (part of my duties as weapons company XO). I would get pissed off because we couldn’t target things in Kuwait because they had to be kept whole for after the war. So the Iraqis could blow up a natural gas plant as we moved through it, but we couldn’t blow up the plant before we moved through it to prevent the Iraqis from blowing it up while we were moving through it. So I guess I was always a little upset with our regimental command on up in the same way that a LCPL was potentially complaining about his company commander.
Marines complain. I guess that is consistent in the series, hehe.
I loved what they did with Trombley this episode, from sucking up carrying around water to his calm freak-out during the ambush with the Russian AA gun. It speaks volumes for the quality of the writing and actors that they can make a character like that sympathetic. The line about being more nervous at home watching game shows was amazing. I’m guessing Wright didn’t just invent that.
I also really like how the show presents the uncertainty of war in cinematic terms without feeling cheap or manipulative. Last episode’s attack on the airfield and this episode’s preparation for the approaching T-72s were played like the lead-in to epic action sequences. You get a sense for the adrenaline rush and the dread, only to discover it’s all fog of war.
Also, the radio comms over the credits with the air force pilots dropping bombs on the phantom tank columns was priceless.
I’m sad it’s now more than half-way over. :( But I look forward to Chris and LK posting almost as much as I look forward to watching the show.
-TomWell, I’d say there’s a reasonable amount of crossover between SEALs and 0321s, at least in terms of their primary mission and how their MOS (and whatever the Navy calls them) schools focus on amphibious reconnaissance (eg, the beach recon as opposed to the harbor mines).
But I’m not sure any of that applies to this corpsman, and I also think that the “special” in special forces does not mean what many civilians take it to mean. I think it most accurately describes highly trained in specific capacities that the general military/infantry is supposed to use them for. That does not in any way take away from their achievement, all it does is constrain the definition under which they are assessed once you accept they meet a much higher initial standard and have a much higher attrition rate in training than everyone else for a reason, but it’s not like the movies. Which I think is what you were getting at, just much more succinctly.
Come to think of it, judging from how I’ve seen SEALS misused in places like Ramadi, it’s possible many in the military fail to understand that distinction. Anyway, that discussion is way more involved and outside of my box than I meant to go on this side note, but that Wright quote has bugged me since the time I saw it.
Marines complain. I guess that is consistent in the series, hehe.
Yeah, I think we agree.
While the episode last night didn’t go into the roadblock scenarios too much, in Wright’s book you learn that they eventually start using green smoke (grenades?) as a first resort. They also realize that the vehicles which make the abrupt u-turns are either scouting positions or are trying to lure them into an ambush
Ahhh, interesting. Man, that scene where they light that truck up is awesome.
This episode was easily the best, although each episode seems to top the preceding one anyway. The first 15 minutes alone, even.
"If you fire that AK again…I’m gonna fuck you up."